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As our world is increasingly developing technological elements, it is imperative to develop 
legal fundamentals in conjunction to such aspects. Patents are a natural part of technology 
and especially concerning licensing thereof. Disputes are additionally a natural part of patent 
licensing, due to several ambiguous terms and definitions that lies within the scope of patent 
law. Therefore, the thesis examines Standard Essential Patent (SEP) licensing under Fair, 
Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms. Additionally, the thesis undertakes 
an analysis of EU’s competition law principles, Article 102 Treaty of the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), due to its harmonious effect within SEP licensing. The aim of the 
thesis is to define the different interpretations of the scope of the term ‘FRAND’ and to 
provide policy recommendations thereof.  
 
The thesis follows a legal-dogmatic research method as a means to identify, systematize, 
interpret and analyze existing laws, principles, doctrines, international agreements and case 
law as they are written. In addition, to legal dogmatism, the thesis shall use comparative law, 
for the analyzation of what ought to change within the European patent system, by 
comparing European case law. The thesis shall especially compare German and United 
Kingdom’s case law, by focusing on ECJ’s ruling in Huawei v. ZTE. 
 
The thesis obtains an analysis with the purpose of identifying both the visible and hidden 
issues relating to SEP licensing and FRAND-encumbrances i.e. definition of the scope of 
the term FRAND. Furthermore, by analyzing the definition, the thesis succeeds in 
identifying such issues. The analysis is being strengthen by policy recommendations aiming 
at providing advice to the aforementioned issues – the recommendations given are limited 
to the European Union and suggest on what ought to be done in order for the current issues 
to diminish and may aid future scholars to create a de lege ferenda analysis based on the 
recommendations hereunder. 
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Maailma muuttuu ja kehittyy jatkuvasti, minkä takia olennaiset lait on oltava 
vuorovaikutuksessa digitalisoinnin tuomiin muutoksiin. Patentit ovat tavanomaisia 
elementtejä teknologiassa, ja erityisesti lisensoinnissa. Kiistat sekä niihin liittyvät 
riidanratkaisut ovat välttämättömiä osia patenttilisensoinnissa epämääräisten määritelmien 
sekä epäjohdonmukaisten tulkkauksien takia. Siitä syystä opinnäytetyö tutkii Standard 
Essential Patent (SEP) lisensointia Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) 
ehtojen mukaan. Lisäksi, opinnäytetyö analysoi Euroopan Unionin kilpailuoikeus 
rajoituksia, Artikla 102 Sopimus Euroopan Unionin toiminnasta (SEUT), sillä 
kilpailuoikeudella on laaja vaikutus SEP lisensointiin. Opinnäytetyön tavoite on todeta ja 
analysoida ongelmat, jotka ilmaantuvat SEP lisensioinnista Euroopassa, jotta työ pystyy 
toimittamaan menettelytapa suosituksia kyseisiin oleviin ongelmiin.  
 
Opinnäytetyö seuraa eritoten oikeusdogmaattista tutkimusmenetelmää, jonka tarkoitus on 
identifioida, systemoida, tulkita sekä analysoida voimassaolevaa lainsäädäntöä, 
kansainvälisiä sopimuksia sekä oikeuskäytäntöä, niin kuin ne ovat kirjoitettu.  
Oikeusdogmatiikan lisäksi, opinnäytetyö käyttää lainsäädäntöjen sekä oikeuskäytäntöjen 
vertailevaa tutkimusta löytääkseen menettelytapasuosituksia. Opinnäytetyö tutkii erityisesti 
Saksan sekä Iso-Britannian oikeuskäytäntöä, keskittyen eritoten Euroopan tuomioistuimen 
Huawei v. ZTE päätökseen.  
 
Opinnäytetyö suorittaa analyysin, joka tuo esiin olennaiset näkyvissä olevat sekä kätketyt 
ongelmat koskien SEP lisensointia, erityisesti ongelmia koskien FRAND termin tulkintaa. 
Analysoinnin myötä, edellä mainitut ongelmat esiintyvät selkeästi. Ongelmien 
havaitsemisen lisäksi, opinnäytetyö toimittaa mainittuihin ongelmiin suosituksia, jotka SEP 
lisensoinnin osapuolet, ja eritoten Euroopan Unionin, pitäisi ottaa huomioon. Nämä 
suositukset selventävät sitä mitä tulisi tehdä, jotta nykypäivän ongelmat vähenisivät, jonka 
lisäksi suositukset voivat auttaa tulevia tutkijoita kehittämään de lege ferenda analyysin.  
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1. Introduction  
1.1. Background 
 
We live in a rapidly changing and adjusting world, hence, computer programs and 
relatable elements thereto becomes more and more accurate in our legal system, not to 
mention in our everyday lives. As Charles Darwin1 said a decade ago, it is the most 
adaptable to change that survives –  during our technological era, it is fair to acknowledge 
that Darwin was right. As the world is developing in a technological manner, our legal 
system ought to keep up with the social and community changes. We ought to applause 
the innovators that have created the world we are living in today. Therefore, the ones that 
invent computer programs, software2 and features thereto, ought to have rights that 
applies to each invention, called intellectual property rights3 (IPR). As an inventor, you 
have the right to both copyright and patent protection, however, patent protection one has 
to acquire, whilst copyright4 is an exclusive right you receive when your invented piece 
of technology is completed. Usually, inventors, organizations and companies seek patent 
protection and further, licenses5 the computer programs i.e. software in order to credit on 
it. This thesis will begin explaining the background to computer programs and related 
elements thereto, specifically from a patent aspect. 
 
1
 “It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent that survives. It is the one that 
is the most adaptable to change” – Charles Darwin 
2 Software is a set of instructions, that tell a computer what to do or how to perform certain tasks, software 
can be both applications on a computer and the operating system itself. Software is a generic term to 
describe computer programs. See Techopedia. However, the concept of software is much broader than 
computer programs per se, although one uses both expressions as synonyms. See Arezzo et al., 2011. 
3
 IP is an intangible right that one can claim ownership for i.e. ideas, inventions, technology, music or 
literature. IP rights can be claimed by a legal person or a company that has created or invented the source 
of the claim. IP rights consists of trademark, copyright, patent  and protect the owner of the IP from 
infringement and additionally, ownership over an IP right allows moral and economic rights. Further see 
Kizza, 2016, p. 88.  
4
 Copyright is an exclusive right, given to the creator of a creative work. See Copyright at WIPO.int. 
5
 If one owns an IP, one can grant rights to use the invention wholly or partially through licensing. See 
Europe.eu, licensing and selling IP.  
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To begin with, software, as a term, may be quite diffuse to explain in a legal sense. 
Artificial Intelligence (AI)6 was first introduced to us by Alan Turing during WWII in 
1935, when he introduced the Turing-machine. The Turing-machine was the first machine 
to use AI; the Turing test was a way to check credibility of AI by asking a question, one 
for a human being and one for a machine, without knowing who is who. The AI passes 
the test if the one asking the question cannot tell the difference between the two answers.7 
Still today, no AI i.e. Computer program has passed the Turing-test. Nonetheless, AI and 
software have gone through a rapid evolution during the past decades. Take a moment 
and think about what is controlled by AI in today’s modern society: let me tell you, 
basically everything. During such evolution it is vital that inventors can use each other’s 
know-how in order to reach new solutions and to ameliorate the present, therefore e.g. 
patents are made available to the public but shall stay exclusively owned for twenty (20) 
years.8 In addition to available patents, actors use licensing in order to help other actors 
in relevant businesses to develop, and re-sell their own products that contain software 
from another actor. There are different kinds of licenses but the main cause for licensing 
is revenue – the original producer receives remuneration by letting other actors use their 
invented software. 
 
It seems as if a patent is a kind of monopoly. A patent provides an inventor with an 
exclusive right to exclude others from making, using, importing, and selling the invention 
that is the subject of the patent for a limited period of time (20 years as mentioned above). 
It should be noted, that while having a patent it allows one to exclude others, but it does 
not confer an absolute right to practice the invention; others may have prior patents that 
can apply to that invention for which a right to exclude could be exercised.  The idea 
behind the exclusive right is an economic one – the investor is rewarded with exclusivity 
for a period of time to monetize the invention (by utilizing any competitive advantage the 
 
6
 As a side note, one should not interfuse AI and source code. AI always contain source code, whilst source 
code is not always AI.  
7 Floridi, 2016, p. 6. 
8
 European IPR helpdesk; European patent.  
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invention provides in the inventor’s products or services, or by licensing the invention to 
others in return for royalties). In return, the inventor must publicly disclose the invention 
so that others may also use it for their own benefit after the limited period of exclusivity 
and improve upon the invention (or perhaps even find alternate solutions that solve the 
same problem as the patented invention but are outside its scope). The idea is that 
ultimately this openness will advance the state of the art overall and advance the society, 
while protecting the rights of, and incentivizing, the bright person who first came up with 
the invention.  
 
Clearly, legal aspects have to be taken into account when someone invents a computer 
program or elements thereto; what protection will the computer program i.e. the software 
receive? The computer programs Directive9 aims to contribute a proper functioning 
between different legal systems in the EU. The main objective with the Directive is to 
ensure that EU countries i) provides copyright protection to computer programs; ii) 
computer programs are protected as literary works10; and iii) computer programs include 
their preliminary design material. However, in this thesis, it is paramount to discuss 
especially patent protection of computer programs (software). Consequently,  the 
European Patent Convention (EPC) Article 52 (2)11 applies on computer programs and 
computer-implemented inventions. In accordance with Article 52, computer programs are 
only eligible for patenting if the software provides a new technical contribution and if the 
subject-matter has a technical character.12 Accordingly, an invention is patentable only if 
it solves a technical problem from a new point of view. 
 
From a copyright perspective, original source code is protected by copyright – similarly 
to literature works. However, whilst copyright protects the original expression of a 
 
9
 Computer Programs Directive (2009/24/EC), issued under the internal market provisions of the Treaty of 
Rome in 1991, most recent version is from 2009.  
10
 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1887.  
11
 See the European Patent Convention Article 52 (2), 1973.  
12
 Stazi, 2015, p. 184.  
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creator, copyright will not protect the underlying technical concept itself. Copyright 
protection do not provide protection for inventive solutions, whilst patent protection 
diversely, protects technical solutions in the form of processes and computer programs.13 
Patent and copyright serve as complementary tools to protect their inventions and to build 
competitive advantage – the strongest protection for software is to enquire both patent 
and copyright protection. In 2007, there was a proposed Directive14 aiming to harmonize 
national patent laws concerning the granting of a patent to a computer program, however, 
the Directive was never approved by the European Parliament in 2005. 
 
When several inventors/organizations have invented useful software, it makes only sense 
that they license their own software in exchange for other useful software they are in a 
need for. Patent pools15 can be used as such a platform, it may take the form of a joint 
venture16, for the purpose of sharing IPRs, specifically patents. The patent pool itself 
allocates the fees regarding patent licensing/use within the patent pool. A patent pool has 
additionally been called a knowledge commons17, constructed by patent owners in the 
same area of technological business, who intends to cross-license their own patents in 
order to achieve something greater. Patent pools are also a part of 21st century capitalism, 
in the sense of networking of companies.  Companies tend to cooperate due to high costs 
of research and development (R&D). Patent pool’s aim it to find essential patents, where 
after they assort them into packages and licenses the packages/patents through an 
individual license agreement. Further, they provide an efficient way to distribute royalties 
 
13
 See European Patent Office, Hardware/Software.  
14
 See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the patentability of 
computer-implemented inventions (Commission proposal COM(2002) 92). 
15
 Patent pools can be defined as an agreement between several patent owners that wish to cross-license 
their patents to other parties within the pool or to third parties. Usually, patent pools are associated with 
technology that require complex software in order to provide efficient technological solutions. See WIPO, 
2014.  
16
 A joint venture (synonym: consortium) is a business entity created by parties (two or more) that share 
risks, ownership and governance in order to gain innovation and skills needed for growth. 
17
 A knowledge commons is a phrase that describes collections and resources of knowledge that contribute 
with free use of such knowledge to the ones who are part of the such structure, organization or social 
institution. See Dreyfuss et al., 2011. 
 5 
 
 
from such patents.18 The central essence of patent pools is to enable interoperability 
between patents and patent holders, in order to secure future innovation’s development.  
 
As patent pools can be a way to allocate know-how, there are alternative ways; certain 
patents that represents pioneering innovation technology that entire industries are built 
on, is called Standard Essential Patents19 (SEP). Representatives of a certain industry 
come together as a Standard Setting Organization (SSO) to develop technical 
specifications of a standard which are called SEPs. They commit to make the SEP 
available through licensing under Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) 
terms. SEPs are allocated by Standard Setting Organizations20 (SSO) who intends so sub-
license such imperative technology to third-persons under Fair, Reasonable and Non-
Discriminatory21 (FRAND) terms. The FRAND requirement promotes broad use of a 
standard and more importantly, ensures that SEP holders receives an award from third 
parties using the patent, whilst not receiving an unfair bargaining advantage.22  
 
We need standards in order for modern technologies to communicate with each other on 
all levels. According to The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) 
and The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards Association (IEEE), 
standards are public documents that establish procedures that aim to provide safety, 
reliability, interoperability and functionality of technologies and further provides variety 
of which users can choose the best suitable option.23 Although, there is not yet a 
commonplace definition of standards, they are usually referred to as technological 
components that authorize independent actors to communicate.24 Henceforth, it is 
 
18
 Vuorinen, 2013, pp. 1-3. Further reading of patent pools Merges et al., 2017. 
19
 See European Commission’s explanation on SEPs. 
20
 See supra note 19. 
21
 See supra note 19. 
22
 Lewis, 2014. p. 2.  
23
 See ETSI at https://www.etsi.org and IEEE Standards Association at https://standards.ieee.org.  
24
 Pitkämäki, 2016, p. 6. See further Koelman, 2006, p. 1.  
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imperative to further examine SSOs and their future effects within our patent system, 
notably in regard to SEP licensing.  
 
The thesis will be primarily be focusing on technological standards i.e. standards that 
secure interoperability between technologies, if such technologies are indeed covered by 
patents and such patents are vital for the function of e.g. smart phones. Further, they are 
to be licensed under FRAND terms, in order for other actors in the same industry to 
develop products using the software, whilst their patents remain protected. SSOs part in 
the mentioned process is to function as a mechanism for innovators to collectively work 
to identify the future innovations. The contributing patents in the established standard, 
shall provide a FRAND assurance. Accordingly, patent holders commit themselves to 
license the patents that have a chance of becoming essential to the implementation of a 
standard.25   
 
Standards can be called ‘technical parameters’ that are universally known by different 
business areas and users. The initial aim of technological SSOs26 and the creation of 
standards were to generate both competition and technological growth.27 SSOs do not 
only comprise of technical standards, they can also comprise of biotechnology, 
pharmaceutical and chemical inventions which the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) is trying to format and grow rapidly.28 However, standards are not 
as straight forward as they may seem. There are e.g. standards that are either de jure or 
de facto standards, which will be further explained within the thesis with the help of case 
law. A de jure standard is a so called ‘formal’ standard which has been created by an 
SSO, whilst de facto standard is primarily accepted by widespread certain-market-
 
25
 Quinn,  2019. IP Watch Dog.  
26
 Compare health standards.  
27
 Bucknell, 2011, p. 738.  
28
 New standards in biotechnology found at www.h-its.org . See also ABB Water purification in the 
pharmaceutical industry found at www.library.e.abb.com.   
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members, hence, it is also called a ‘de facto industry standard’.29 Even though these 
standards are created by different paths, they are both part of the same obligations 
thereunder. Moreover, both standards are subject to competition law principles, and 
therefore, a commitment to an SSO might not be as absolute as it may seem, members 
part of a de facto standard may abuse their dominant position in the same manner as 
members of a de jure standards and SSOs.  
 
These mentioned standards contain several, if not thousands, of relevant SEPs that are 
essential to the standard. As stated, even though de facto standards are not part of an SSO, 
they are still part of the FRAND obligation, including competition law obligations that 
come along with FRAND commitment. Even though SEP licensing is vastly part of patent 
laws and principles, competition legislations have in addition an effect on FRAND – a 
SEP holder may in certain situations abuse its dominant position under a FRAND 
commitment, which will be examined later on in the thesis. Furthermore, the world faces 
both challenges and opportunities with SEP licensing under FRAND terms. SEP holders 
may find new opportunities since standards cover more and more technologies. However, 
the burden of resolving disputes, injunction and competition question are hot topics at the 
moment. Both small and large businesses have struggled with challenges relating to SEP 
licensing; negotiating licenses, determining royalties for FRAND, seeking injections, 
avoiding abuse of dominant position, seeking recoveries for a SEP holder’s neglect of its 
FRAND commitments or the denial of a potential licensee to accept a license under 
FRAND terms.30 All of these issues will additionally be examined carefully throughout 
the thesis.  
 
Although, governments in different jurisdictions have tried to discuss the above-
mentioned challenges by focusing on transparency, balance and reasonableness, still not 
all licenses are created in an equal way, even under FRAND terms. Additionally, 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms ought to be developed in order to resolve SEP 
 
29
 Den Uijl, 2015, p. 3. Examples of de facto standards are e.g. VHS, DVD, MP3, Excel and Word.  
30
 Hines, 2019, WIPO Magazine.  
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matters quickly and effectively.31 The European Commission (EC) issued in the summer 
of 2018 an expert group whose aim is to promote an efficient, smooth and balanced 
framework in order to encourage technological development and the broad use of 
standards. In order to reach such goals, the EC called on SSOs to ameliorate the access 
to information of SEPs along with transparency since there are hurdles regarding such. 
SSOs provide vague platforms for searching after SEPs and licensing thereto, hence, 
hurdles has arisen in conjunction with license negotiations. Accordingly, the EC favors 
imposing new requirements for SSOs.32  
 
The topic of the thesis is important due to, firstly, its importance within our developing 
community, secondly, the competitiveness and incentive it brings to competitors and 
lastly, the ambiguousness of the components composing the complex formation of SEP 
licensing. Due to these three factors, it is imperative to analyze them in order to enhance 
future interoperability and development, as well as avoid vagueness and 
misinterpretations of such. Standardization does not only enhance innovation, but it also 
enhances the spreading of know-how and by doing that, further enhancing development 
and technical growth.33 However, the issues with standardization, are the dubious 
descriptions of the elements which further creates disputes between innovators and users. 
As Ericsson describes standardization: “[…] No company can invent the entire system. 
So you have to have cross-licensing and interoperability. It is like a Rubik’s cube – 
everything depends on everything else.”34 Due to the importance of cooperation and 
interaction between users and SEP holders, the definitions have to be examined further to 
avoid future hindrances. 
 
1.2. Research question  
 
 
31
 Ibid.  
32
 Ibid.  
33
 BNQ, Importance of Standardization found at www.bnq.qc. 
34
 Telefonaktiebolaget Ericsson LM, The Importance of Standardization found at www.Ericsson.com. 
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The main objectives the thesis shall examine, as title might suggest, is to provide policy 
recommendations to the issues the European Union (EU) faces regarding SEP licensing 
under FRAND terms. Henceforth, the thesis will go into the depth of identifying SEP 
licensing issues and their effects thereto. However, prior to that, one has to analyze the 
different definitions and interpretations of the scope of the term FRAND along with its 
effects. As stated, the thesis shall especially focus on licensing under FRAND terms, 
however, before one can analyze such expression, one has to narrate the background to 
the mentioned expressions conducive to the identification of the main research question. 
Ultimately, the most integral part of the thesis is the discussion and analysis chapter, in 
which the thesis will provide possible policy recommendations to the established issues 
within the EU. Accordingly, the thesis shall examine EU treaties and case law. 
 
The foundation for the whole analysis shall be the procedural framework for licensing 
negotiations created by the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ)35 case of Huawei 
technologies v. ZTE. The judgment caused a lot of interpretation in national courts around 
Europe regarding establishing a persistent set of rules for determining whether SEP has 
actually been licensed under FRAND terms.36 Alongside Huawei technologies v. ZTE the 
thesis shall analyze follow-up cases after the Huawei ruling around Europe, especially 
German and United Kingdom’s rulings.37 Accordingly, the thesis shall discuss the pros 
and cons of the European SEP licensing system de lege lata in pursuance of providing 
possible policy recommendation options. It is exclusively logical to include case law 
analyzations to the extent of enhancing the changes and interpretation such case law has 
 
35
 Court of Justice of the European union, 1952. 
36
 White & Case, 2019; Another FRAND decision in Europe: Clarity or Confusion? White & case 
publications. 
37
 See e.g. Archos S.A. v. Koninklijke Philips N.V. 2017, Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Wiko SAS 2019; Sisvel 
v. Haier, Düsseldorf Regional Court, n°4a O 144/14, judgment on 3 November 2015, Sisvel v. Haier, 
Dusseldorf Court of Appeals (Oberlandesgericht), Cases I-15 U 65/15 and I-15 U 66/15, judgement on 13 
January 2016; Commission’s decisions Motorola & Samsung 2014; Saint Lawrence Communications v. 
Vodafone, Case 4a O 73/14, judgement on 31 March 2016; Unwired Planet v. Huawei EWHC 958 (Pat), 
judgement on 29 April 2016 & EWHC 711 (Pat), judgement on 05 April 2017; Conversant v Huawei & 
ZTE, EWHC 1687 (Pat), judgement on 4 July 2019. 
 10 
 
 
contributed with on a European level. Consequently, the thesis shall not examine case 
law’s effects on an international level, solely European court’s rulings.  
 
By researching SEP licensing, it is only natural to include European competition law, 
specifically Article 102 Treaty of the Functioning of the European union (TFEU)38; many 
issues within the EU, with regard to SEP licensing, has, as briefly mentioned earlier, a 
connection to competition law principles, including the ruling of Huawei technologies v. 
ZTE. Although, the main objective within the thesis shall not be competition laws, it is 
fair to include aspects of it towards analyzing the pros and cons of the SEP licensing 
system as a whole. 
 
1.3. Structure of the thesis & delimitation 
 
The thesis is divided into five (5) parts. Each part settles a vital element in the formation 
of the thesis’s purpose. Whilst part one covers the background and basic knowledge of 
the thesis, including research question and methodology, part two examines the basic 
facts of both software and licensing. It is important to understand the basic elements that 
standard essential patents are based on, in order to examine SEP licensing thoroughly. 
Accordingly, FRAND terms are examined profoundly in the light of competition laws 
and Article 102 TFEU. Further, part three of the thesis delivers a case analysis on ECJ’s 
judgment in Huawei technologies v. ZTE and undertakes an analysis thereto. The most 
integral part of the thesis is part four, discussion and analysis, in which the thesis 
identifies the issues and their effects the EU faces, mentioned throughout the thesis, and 
further provides policy recommendations for SEP licensing under FRAND terms 
thereunder. To conclude the thesis, the final part wraps up the current situation based on 
the analysis and proposes future actions.  
 
The thesis shall not examine international case law nor patent pools extensively in order 
to delimit the thesis. As aforementioned, the thesis examines European case law and tries 
 
38
 See Article 102 Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (2012/C 326/01). 
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to find a middle-ground solution regarding the European legal system, hence, 
international case law is needless to analyze in the thesis, apart from the mentioning of 
integral cases.  Additionally, the thesis shall not examine the elements of a patent pool 
although they have a connection to SEPs. The thesis shall focus on the dilemma between 
SEP and FRAND licensing solely in the EU. Additionally, the thesis shall not examine 
software from a copyright point of view, instead focus on patentable computer software 
and essentials thereto. However, the thesis shall only discuss briefly the copyright 
perspective to give the reader a found on how computer programs may be protected. 
Additionally, the thesis shall concisely discuss the background and meaning of software, 
Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) as an alternative protection method and the 
concept of licensing from primarily a patent point of view, mentioning copyright 
protection due to its interoperability with patent protection, in order to analyze the 
research question profoundly. 
 
1.4. Methodology  
 
Methodologies of legal research are not enhanced by general rules nor guidelines. Instead, 
choices regarding epistemological (information collecting) and ontological (existence) 
will guide the scope of the thesis,  the theoretical approach and the selected sources of 
law. Accordingly, the choices made will have an impact on the methodology of the 
thesis.39  The thesis follows a legal-dogmatic research method as a means to identify, 
systematize, interpret and analyze existing laws, principles, doctrines, international 
agreements and case law as they are written.40 The legal-dogmatic research method has 
been well known within the Nordic countries for its subjective research method.41 In 
addition to legal-dogmatism, the thesis shall use comparative law for the analyzation of 
what ought to change within the European patent system by comparing European case 
 
39
 Hirvonen, 2011. pp. 58–61.  
40
 Peczenic, 2005. p. 249.  
41
 Bärlund et al., 2016, p. 36. 
 12 
 
 
law. The thesis shall especially compare German and United Kingdom’s case law, by 
focusing on ECJ’s ruling in Huawei Technologies v. ZTE. 
 
The research methods are relevant since the thesis will analyze and interpret existing laws 
and case law valid within European Union in order to analyze and establish policy 
recommendations. As Aarnio points out, the legal dogmatic truth is reciprocal; there may 
be multiple perceptions for a single legal issue. The majority of people will choose the 
perception which has the best arguments, and therefore, in order to convince such group 
of people, one is allowed to use any interpretation, all things considered, in case the 
perception has a legal basis and the hierarchy of law is accordingly adhered to.42 As Husa 
points out, comparative law means roughly legal comparison, born in the nineteenth 
century, in continental Europe, conjointly with the academic thinking and analyzation. 
Comparative law was first seen as a comparative legal science which further means, that 
comparative law is usually connected to academic contexts. Additionally, according to 
Husa, comparative law is both seen as a ‘research branch’ and as a ‘research method’.43  
 
The thesis shall examine laws on a European level and above all Article 102 of the TFEU 
– the European Union can be described as a legal person; the base for the whole EU is de 
facto TFEU. Our national laws are governed by EU law and regulations; EU legislation 
can be divided into three legal acts: i) regulations; ii) directives; and iii) decisions. A 
regulation is the strongest form of legislation within the EU, it is binding for every 
member state simultaneously. Directives on the other hand ought to be implemented and 
harmonized into national law within a certain timeframe. Directives normally sets a 
minimum-standard the member states have to achieve. Decisions are only binding for the 
ones to whom it may be addressed.44 Article 102 that shall be examined in the thesis is 
 
42
 
 
Aarnio, 1978. pp. 103 and 124. 
43
 Husa, 2015, pp. 16–17. 
44
 Bärlund et al., 2016, p. 5.  
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part of EU’s constitutional pillar – each member state has to follow the TFEU in the same 
way as their own jurisdiction.45 
 
Jurisprudence is directed by rule of law and rationality; In the pursuance of achieving 
such, one has to be able to prove one’s findings. By providing strong arguments one has 
to identify the legal problems and provide coherent solutions.46 The thesis shall follow 
such interpretations and legal problem solving – references and material used in the thesis 
consists of literature such as monographs, doctrine and articles, international agreements 
and specifically European case law as presented above. The thesis examines closely 
European case law as well as European conventions in order to analyze its core challenges 
and develop policy recommendations, which makes the legal dogmatic research method 
along with comparative law a natural choice for the purpose of identifying, interpreting 
and systematically analyzing case law.   
  
 
45
 2012/C 326/01 
46
 Hellner, 1998, p. 488.  
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2. SEP Licensing 
2.1. Introduction  
 
Basic facts regarding software and licensing has already been presented, however, it is 
fair to acknowledge that the thesis has to enhance both elements in order to analyze the 
research question further. The expression ‘software’ has actually never been defined in a 
legal sense; however, it is yet commonly known as a collection of materials that helps the 
computer to function, but which does not include hardware47. Software includes 
preparatory design material, source and object code, development tools, computer media, 
data files, outputs, displays, languages among other things.48 Besides software, it is 
imperative, that the thesis clarifies the expression of licensing, since the thesis will 
examine licensing to a high extent. By licensing a product one gives away (licensor) the 
right to another actor in the same industry (licensee) to use the product against a specified 
payment. Licensing helps other actors to instantly market and produce certain products 
that other companies have spent years on building, whilst in return the licensor gets paid 
for the granted license, for example a specific percentage i.e. royalties of the revenue sold 
from licensor’s original product.49  
 
In addition to defining software and licensing as two different elements in this chapter, 
SSOs will be examined as a private voluntary institution incorporating the most 
exemplary patents into a standard, who represents industry participants with highly 
essential patents.50 As mentioned, there are a lot of issues arising from SEP licensing, 
evidently SEPs are five times more in litigation disputes than normal patents, mostly in 
 
47
 Computer hardware is the tangible part of a computer and related devices that one can see. Hardware 
usually includes software. See Techopedia. 
48
 Bainbridge, 1999; software copyright law. p. 2. 
49
 Small Business encyclopedia; Licensing. 
50
 Tsilikas, 2017; Antitrust enforcement and standard essential patents: moving beyond the FRAND 
commitment. p. 11. 
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the context of ‘smartphone wars’.51 The chapter will additionally undertake an 
examination regarding European competition laws, especially Article 102 TFEU.  
 
2.1.1. Software that may become protected 
 
Computer program/software is difficult to classify, hence, the legal protection of such is 
still problematic. Software, as stated earlier, is a set of instructions to perform certain 
tasks, where after the instructions which leads to the desired task follows an algorithm52.  
One should not get confused when hearing ‘computer’ software – it applies on all devices 
that uses computer technology e.g. mobile phones or smart televisions.  In order for a 
computer software to perform its task, it has to go through the following phases:  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.53 Computer software items 
 
51
 Ibid. p. 12.  Further see Beldiman, 2015 pp. 23-26 regarding the expression ‘smartphone wars’.  
52
 An algorithm is a comprehensive set of certain instructions for the purpose of carrying out an activity or 
further, solving a problem. Computers use algorithms to e.g. list comprehensive instructions for carrying 
out the said activity. To accomplish such tasks, appropriate data have to be instituted into the system. See 
Techopedia.  
53
 See Bainbridge, 1999; software copyright law. p. 3.  
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Figure 1 explains the different items a computer software consists of.  It is imperative to 
understand each element in this sequence, since each element could be an invention  as 
such, which further means that legal rights are connected thereto. Let us begin by 
explaining the base of the figure; ‘preparatory design material’ is the base of the 
software, the plan of the process and algorithms. The logic map for the software consists 
of a flowchart which includes input (what the software user wants the computer to 
accomplish), output (the information produced by the computer) and in between the 
processing of the algorithms and decision (see figure 2).54 The source code is a result of 
the implemented flowchart, which further turns the implemented flowchart into a set of 
instructions, using a programming language of choice. The code is later translated into 
the chosen machine language which is referred to as object code.  The operation is not 
yet, however, complete; the object code needs memory based executable code which it 
receives from ‘information stored digitally’ box. This stage of the operations gives the 
object code the missing variable addresses and personal routines. Finally, the operation 
reaches its end as the computer completes the tasks the user wanted, called outputs.55  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.56  
Flowchart of computer decisions 
 
54
 Kizza, 2016, p. 89. 
55
 Ibid. p. 90.  
56
 See Ibid. p. 89.  Figure 2 explains the decision-making a computer makes when user inputs a task which 
results in an output.  
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2.1.1.1. Legal protection of software 
 
After a short introduction on how computer software works, it is only natural to define 
which parts, and why, are protected by patents, principally, and briefly copyright 
protection in order to enhance the interoperability between the two protection methods. 
Patents have a huge impact on our society; patents can contribute with encouragements 
to innovation and to publicly display technological information. A patent can be seen as 
a bargain between society and an innovator – the innovator receives monopoly whilst the 
innovations are made available to the public.57 As mentioned before, it is imperative that 
there is a disclosure requirement regarding patents, it would be a waste of useful time if 
innovators would not have access to patents, instead, it is the purpose of patent law to 
enable competition and rivalry by disclosing patents. 
 
If software would be developed for the use of only one person, the need for legal 
protection would be irrelevant. However, in the vast majority of cases, software has a 
market value and competitors finds it useful to acquire a copy of the software for their 
own purpose of use. An innovator faces two problems; first, some users wish to copy the 
software without payment which leads to an infringement of the patent. Second, rivalries 
wish to examine the patent further in order to make competitive inventions. In both cases, 
the inventor faces economic risks and hence, it is important to examine patent laws 
further.58 Accordingly, an invention has to comply with the following requirements in 
accordance with the Article 52 EPC59  (see below) in order for the patent to become valid:  
 
 
57
 Mylly, 2011, p. 1.  
58
 Bainbridge, 1999; software copyright law. p. 9. 
59
 Computer programs are actually not yet considered as patentable under the EPC if a patent application 
is in connection to computer programs as such. The wording as such refers to source and object code (see 
page 12), since computer programs are considered a non-technical process. However, this does not mean a 
computer program is not patentable: EPO board of appeal’s Vicom-ruling (T 208/84) established the 
meaning of technical effect that a computer possesses which means computers are after all patentable due 
to its technical effect despite computer program’s lack of patentable subject matter. Haapanen, 2017, pp. 
70–71 and Shemtov, 2017, pp. 179–180.   
 18 
 
 
1) The invention has to include a technical character;  
2) The invention has to be novel; 
3) The invention has to involve an inventive step that is non-obvious to someone in 
the relatable field of industry; 
4) The invention is responsive to industrial application. 
If an invention does meet all the aforementioned criteria, the innovator is eligible to seek 
for  a patent. If an invention receives protection, the patent will become available for the 
public, as well as receive a protection of twenty (20) years. When a patent has expired, 
anyone can take advantage of the lapsed patented invention.60 The EU faces however 
standard issues regarding a unitary patent system, since the legislation is contradicting 
and has loopholes, which contributes with national interpretations by not expressing 
enough specific criteria for patent granting61, as will also be examined later on regarding 
the FRAND term.  
All European Countries are part of the Paris Convention62 which concerns the protection 
of patents, even if the convention does not clarify the criteria for patentability nor the 
patentable subject matter. In addition to the Paris Convention, TRIPS agreement63, under 
the WTO, does regulate the aforementioned expressions. Article 27 TRIPS applies on any 
invention as long as the invention fulfils the criteria as presented above. Article 27 sets a 
non-discrimination principle and possibilities to exclude patents (does not apply on 
computer programs). The interpretation of national courts regarding the Article is 
rigorous, since they have to recognize computer-implemented inventions if they are to 
obey the Article.64 
 
60
 Uotila, 2019, p. 21.  
61
 See EPO’s (European Patent Office) interpretation of  IBM I and II cases and Virtanen, 2013, pp. 620–
632.  
62
 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 20 March 1883. 
63
 Agreement on trade-related aspects on intellectual property rights, 1 January 1995. 
64
 Mylly, 2011, p. 6. 
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The European Commission proposed a draft for Directive COM (2002) 9265 in 2002, 
which aimed to harmonize the various practices by member states regarding computer 
programs. The Commission observed that the European patent system lacked certainty, 
however, the Directive received lobbying and never entered into force. Consensus has 
never been reached on the subject and therefore, computer program’s patent protection in 
Europe is still vague and solely based on national laws that partly comply with the EPC 
and EPO case law.66 Hopefully, a change is upon us since the EU needs some kind of 
unitary patent system, which would solve the ambiguousness and loopholes in our 
legislation. Accordingly, in 2013 the Unitary Patent Regulation (UPR) was adopted, 
however, it has not yet become effective67. The aim with the regulation is to receive a 
European patent with unitary effect, with exclusive competence in infringement and 
invalidity. Additionally, the forthcoming Unified Patent Court (UPC) is also binding to 
ECJ’s decisions.68 The reform would not change the patentability but instead the issues 
and exceptions the EU faces would become uniform with equal effects on European 
patents, excluding compulsory license regulations which would still be up to member 
states to decide.69 Without further ado, time will tell whether such regulation shall 
combine the interpretations and determine a final scope of patent protection. 
Although the thesis focuses on patent protection, it is paramount to enhance copyright 
protection of software as well.70 As mentioned earlier, computer programs can receive 
both patent and copyright protection, however, the key is the interoperability that exist 
between the two protections – both covers areas that the other one does not, which makes 
them dependent on each other. As a clarification, if an invention is in connection to 
software the invention may receive both copyright and patent protection, but if software 
 
65
 See supra note 14.  
66
 Haapanen, 2007, p. 73. 
67
 It shall become valid when the Unified Patent Court Agreement enters into force. Kur, 2013, p.153. See 
also Pila, 2015, chapter 3.  
68
 Ibid. pp. 151–155.  
69
 Mylly, 2013,  p. 49–50. 
70
 2009/24/EC 
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does not fulfil the patent requirements, then the software receives solely copyright 
protection. For the avoidance of doubt, the ultimate outcome for a software developer 
would be to accomplish the patent requirements as an addition to the already received 
copyright protection.  
2.1.1.2. Alternative protection methods for software 
 
In order to understand the whole concept of software licensing and different methods one 
can use, it is fair to describe Free and Open Source software71 (FOSS) briefly. In the 
1960s it was common for universities and technology companies to share source code, 
which lead to source code circulating to developers and customers. IBM at the time, was 
the most dominant manufacture in the hardware business and its computer programs were 
simply a promotion of IBM’s hardware. Accordingly, IBM sold its customers the source 
code and permitted them to improve and share the changes within the software; in only a 
short time, software as such had found its own market. Microsoft was one of the first 
technology companies to restrain the use of their software in the manner of redistribution 
and modification.72 The last decades has contributed with tremendous evolution in the 
use of FOSS in commercial contexts, and FOSS is often seen as a default approach to 
software. FOSS is often licensed if the software complies with the Free Software 
Definition73 (see below) set by the Free Software Foundation (FSF):  
 
1) the freedom to run the program for any purpose; 
2) the freedom to study how the program works and the freedom to change it; 
3) the freedom to redistribute copies of the program; 
4) the freedom to distribute copies of modified versions of the program.  
 
71
 Free and open-source software (FOSS) grants users the right to edit, modify or reuse the source code of 
the software, which further gives developers a chance to improve software program’s functionalities by 
modifying them. The term free illustrates the lack of copyright on the software. The term open source 
illustrates that the software is still in project form, enabling software development to collaborate worldwide 
without any need for reverse engineering. See Techopedia.  
72
 Välimäki 2005, pp. 14 and 21–24. 
73
 See Free Software Definition written by Richard Stallman and published by the FSF. 
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In addition to the Free Software Definition, computer program’s license terms have to 
comply with the Open Source Definition74 (see below) set by the Open Source Initiative 
(OSI) and allow/restrict the user to:  
 
1) distribute or sell the software, without royalty fee; 
2) access the source code of the software; 
3) modify and distribute the modified version under the precise same license;  
4) protect the virtue of the original author’s source code;  
5) discriminate persons, groups or fields of endeavors; 
6) distribute the license; 
7) specify the licensing to a certain product or restrict other software;  
8) not to be biased. 
 
Each contributor to FOSS should understand which rights are actually licensed when 
licensing under FOSS terms – which rights are actually received and distributed. We live 
in a fierce competitive world, thus, IPR owned rights are a huge asset. License terms 
should be clearly identified  in order to prevent unexpected impacts or infringements i.e. 
does the license include sublicensing rights?75 FOSS licenses have been controversial for 
quite a long time and the licenses are often characterized with contract law and thus, the 
majority of countries, not only in Europe, apply basic contract law principles on FOSS 
licenses. Problems that arise of license-contract law disputes are often solved 
pragmatically. Axel Metzger claimed that “one should not overestimate the legal 
consequences” coming from the characterization of FOSS licenses seen as contracts.76   
 
2.1.2. Software Licensing  
 
 
74
 See Open Source Definition written by Eric Raymond and published by the OSI.  
75
 Haapanen, 2017, pp. 16–19.  
76
 Metzger, 2016, p. 45.  
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The software industry is an inconclusive concept; the industry is growing all the time and 
is characterized by hasty technological development. During the last fifty years, the 
industry has been built by various expansions and technological paradigms. The majority 
of the technology companies founded in the 1950s and 1960s are gone, and today there 
are only a handful of companies who rule the markets and therefore, licensing is of 
paramount importance. 77 The one who has invited an innovation (licensor) grants rights 
to another party (licensee) to use the software in the manner the licensor have granted the 
rights i.e. the licensor may refuse the licensee from using the software in certain ways or 
to sub-license the software. Licensing is fairly one of the best ways to expand one’s 
business both nationally and internationally. Within the license agreement parties have to 
agree on some of the following terms; to which extent the licensee is allowed to use the 
software, an explanation of the existing patent protection of the software, export 
restrictions, liabilities, warranties, terms of payment, confidentiality clauses and so on.78 
Accordingly, and most importantly, both parties ought to understand the rights and 
restrictions of the license agreement.79    
 
A typical license agreement is written in ‘jargon’ and ‘legalese’ which means it may be 
fairly difficult to understand, and certain terms may be hidden within the sentences. 
Software licensing usually address and restrict what the licensee can do with the licensed 
software, including for what purposes it can be used and if one infringes the clauses what 
consequences shall apply. A question brought up regarding software licensing is whether 
a licensed software shall be seen as a ‘work of authorship’ or a ‘copy of the software’? 
There is usually a specification within the license agreement that the software is not being 
‘sold’, which means the licensor maintains ownership over IP. An interesting fact, 
however, is that the licensor usually keeps title over the original IP but also over the 
 
77
 Välimäki, 2005, p. 13.  
78
 Aalto-Setälä et al., 2016, pp. 69–70.  Within telecommunications cross-licensing has been the most used 
model – more efficient to license a whole patent portfolio instead of patent-by-patent licensing. See 
Harkrider, 2013, p. 22.  
79
 As a clarification, one should not confuse ‘software licensing’ with ‘patent licensing’. They do differ in 
the way that ‘technology licensing’ does not specifically include a patent whilst ‘patent licensing’, on the 
other hand, does explicitly indicate on patents.   
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copy.80 Further, copyright aspects are often considered in software licensing; in a classic 
proprietary software license the user i) is granted a limited right to use the program; ii) is 
not entitled to make amendments or corrections to the program; and iii) the user is not 
provided with access to source code.81 Open source license provides, on the other hand, 
much broader rights to the user. The main characteristics of an open source license, allows 
the user: i) a broad right to copy the program; ii) to make amendments and error 
corrections to the program; and iii) access to source code.82  Therefore, an open source 
license  provides the user with a broader right to amend and further develop the computer 
program.  
 
The most prominent type of FOSS licensing is the General Public License (GPL)83 which 
is used for example in Linux and other FOSS projects. GPL grants the licensee the right 
to use, modify, copy and distribute the licensed software along with licensee obligations 
to provide the license text to the recipient of the distributed software and to duplicate all 
features of the program in the distributed copy. There is also a license called a ‘simple 
open source license’ BSD license84 which do not, on the contrary, provide obligations for 
the licensee. Other license communities have learned from the Open source development 
and created own distribution models in different sectors e.g. Creative Commons (CC)85. 
CC is a liberal standardized license regime which allows redistribution – not all licenses 
provide modification rights. Some CC licenses contain a somewhat ‘share-alike’ clause 
 
80
 Philips, 2009, pp. ix–8.  
81
 See Article 4 2009/24/EC. 
82
 Riis, 2016, pp. 101–106.  
83
 See GNU GPL at www.gnu.org. GPL includes also a so called copyleft provision that limits the 
licensee’s freedom to distribute amended and secondary versions of the software. In other words, the 
provision requires all amendments to the software to be licensed under the same license term as the original 
program. See Riis, 2016, p. 105. The GPL is having a so called strong copyleft whilst e.g. BSD has a weak 
copyleft and further, MIT (https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT) or Apache version 2.0 
(https://www.apache.org) does not contain any copyleft at all.  
84
 See BSD at www.opensource.org. 
85
 See www.creativecommons.org.  
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which is comparable to ‘copyleft’86. In addition to CC, Wikipedia is a known ‘open-
content’ platform where anyone can distribute and modify the contents.87   
 
It is important to promptly decide the legal nature of a software license i.e. is it more of 
a sale of goods contract or perhaps a service contract? It is fundamental to decide the 
subject-matter for the license in order to determine the legal effects and constraints 
contained within the license. Usually though, organizations will be part of license 
agreements which directly excludes consumer protection within the license deal. Usually 
the owner of a software has de facto the stronger position when licensing, especially in 
patent licensing if the patent is part of a standard; the owner may license his products 
expensively and unduly interfere with the licensee’s use of the software.88 Accordingly, 
the next chapters shall more extensively examine specifically patent licensing, including  
SEPs, standards, FRAND and competition laws governing patent licensing 
 
2.2. Standard Essential Patents 
 
Patents and standards are both important for innovation, development and further, for the 
interplay between the two. The interoperability is ensured by standards and further, 
technologies are extensively displayed between corporations and private consumers. 
Patents, on the other hand, provide R&D89 which encourage and permits innovators to 
receive a return on investments.90 A standard essential patent (SEP) is a patent that 
 
86
 Supra note 83. 
87
 Metzger, 2016, pp. 4–6. 
88
 Bainbridge, 1999; Software Licensing. pp. 84–85.  
89
 Research and Development. 
90
 Royalties based on patent licensing can be seen as an ‘industrial tax’ since the patent is already available 
to the public and thus, the sole use of the patent is costly even though the information is public. Accordingly, 
patent infringement happens quite often due to the fact that the users do not see themselves obliged to pay 
for something that is already available.  
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protects technology essential to a specific standard.91 Accordingly, SEPs protect 
inventions i.e. technologies that are, in other words, essential for complying with such a 
technical standard. Standards do not only encourage innovation and growth in Europe, 
but also provides interoperability of technologies.  Known standardized technologies are 
e.g. long-term evolution (LTE), WiFi, or Bluetooth which are all naturally protected by 
SEPs. As a result of the widespread use of standardized technologies, interconnectivity is 
possible.92  
 
Each device such as smartphones or Wi-Fi have different technological components, but 
each part has to work together in order to function, which further means that these devices 
have to comply with standards i.e. a set of instructions that such devices follow and 
communicate with in order to achieve their goals. Such standards may affect patents that 
are part of such devices i.e. a patent that is part of such a technology, which is used in a 
standard, may call itself a SEP. A SEP is a patent that must be used whether a company 
wishes to commercially deploy an adopted standard.93 The owner of a SEP (as part of a 
standard) will receive remarkable business engagements since the owned SEP has to 
become part of each technological device that goes under the standard terms e.g. the 
revenues received from licensing a SEP will rely solely on the standard’s value and not 
the SEP per se. In other words, SEP holders ought to ensure access to their SEPs in order 
for a standard, that include the SEP, to become widely ratified. However, if a SEP holder 
refuses to license the SEP due to the SEP’s presumed value in comparison with the 
standard, it is called a licensing ‘hold-up’94. Fortunately, standard setting organizations 
(SSO) try to avoid licensing hold-ups by cautiously accepting SEPs into a standard in the 
 
91
 See further Lee, 2006, pp. 7–8: A SEP is a patent that a company have to use if they wish to produce 
standard compliant products. 
92
 Verhoeven, 2019 at https://premiercercle.com.  
93
 Atik, 2019, p. 949. 
94
 Hold-up is an economic term for defining when a SEP holder claims excessive royalties for its 
technology after a standard is adopted. Horizontal Guidelines 2011, paragraph 269. Further see 
Pentheroudakis, European Commission, 2017. Compare ‘patent hold-out’ where licensees do not take a 
license in order to pressure the SEP holder to agree to licensee’s below FRAND terms, see iam-media, 
2020.  
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first place. Additionally, SSOs created the so called FRAND95 terms (Fair, Reasonable, 
and Non-Discriminatory) under which the SEP have to be licensed.96  
 
SEPs are both controversial and important since they are simply essentials to a standard. 
The computer and telecommunications industries depend on SEPs and standards, in order 
for the companies to cooperate i.e. if a computer uses Wi-Fi the computer sends and 
receives data according to a set of instructions97; such instructions are patented and 
claimed to be necessary in order to implement Wi-Fi. Therefore, if one wants the phone 
to communicate with other devices through Wi-Fi,  the phone has to comply with the 
instructions. Standards are important, but since they are so important, SSOs worries 
whether patent holders may exclude other companies from using standards which would 
interfere with the interoperability. Therefore, the SSO have limited the acceptance of 
patents for standards. Further, the SSOs require patent holders to license their SEPs under 
FRAND terms to anyone who ratifies the standard (in which the technology/patent in 
question is part of).98 In spite of licensing limitations i.e. FRAND-encumbrances, SEPs 
are yet extremely powerful; entire industries ratify standards and pay licensing fees every 
time the standards are used. 
 
Evidently, our developing society is depending on today’s standards, however, we are 
sometimes blind towards them. Standards indicate technological development, 
interoperability and tries to lower transaction costs. Due to standards we can smoothly 
use our smartphones and connect them to Wi-Fi or use computer hardware standards, for 
example USB. Additionally, on the one hand, standards encourage competition and 
innovation, but on the other, the risk of hold-ups increases. SEP holders may unfairly but 
 
95
 Outside Europe it is more often referred to as RAND (Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory) or F/RAND, 
leaving out the ‘Fair’ part.  
96
 Lewis, 2014, p. 2. 
97
 Wireless Fidelity is a type of wireless network technology. Wi-Fi works the same way as a radio; sends 
waves to a detecting device that decipher the waves and sends it back to the Wi-Fi data router. See 
Techopedia. 
98
 Lemley, 2019, pp. 609–610.  
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rightfully target non-licensed users with patent infringement lawsuits by demanding 
royalties along with injunctions.99 A smartphone may contain thousands of SEPs which 
further allow interoperability across platforms; in order to produce one smartphone 
without infringing thousands of patents the patents have to be licensed.  
 
2.2.1. Standard Setting Organization 
 
Standardization was first introduced in the European Union to promote the ‘free 
movement of goods’, when tariffs were removed between the member states in 1968 – it 
may also be seen as the beginning of the harmonization of technical standards. The 
harmonization comprised, however, issues regarding different technical regulations in 
different member states. In order for the European Union to achieve a common 
harmonized market, technical standards, and regulations regarding them, had to become 
harmonized. Standardization encourage the functioning of a single market and supports 
among others competitiveness, innovation and protection of health and safety.100 
 
SSOs establish and disseminate technology standards in various industries. There are 
thousands of standards organizations establishing different standards. The SSO adopts a 
standard if the majority of its members vote for the standard in question and if the standard 
maximizes their market returns, so basically the SSO chooses the most economically 
beneficial standards.101 SSOs can vary in both size and formation, hence, the European 
Commission has identified three different categories of SSOs102: i) formally recognized  
standardization bodies103; ii) quasi-formal standardization bodies e.g. international 
 
99
 Lim, 2014, pp. 3–4. As aforementioned, the SSOs put the FRAND requirement in order to avoid hold-
ups. However, theoretically, SEP holders may produce their services and charge significant royalties 
outside the standards. See Xiaowen, 2015, p. 6.  
100
 Zhang, 2012, p. 21.  
101
 Spulber, 2018, p. 3.  
102
 European Commission, 2014, p.31. See further Bharadwaj et al., 2018, p. 2.  
103
 For example, International Organization for Standardization and the European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (ETSI).  
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organizations that possess same characteristics as formal organizations104; and iii) 
standardization consortia105. Despite the different categories, usually the stakeholders of 
standardization bodies produce standards voluntarily and not the SSOs themselves. If a 
stakeholder participates in the standardization process and hides the fact the he or she 
holds essential patents to the standard which is being developed, it is called a ‘patent 
ambush’.106 The SSO is a joint movement of members that are usually competitors 
outside the SSO. European SSOs are governed by the EU acquis Communautaire and are 
commonly instructed by the European Commission – they deliver ‘EU standards” known 
as European Norms107 (ENs). All European standardization bodies have to comply with 
EU legislation, and specifically competition laws. The following figure explains the 
institutional and regulatory framework of SSOs and the connection it has to the EU:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.108 
Institutional and regulatory framework  
 
104
 For example, the IEEE Standards Association and ASTM International.  
105
 For example, Bluetooth and USB.  
106
 Randakevičiūtė, 2015, p. 27. See Commission’s Decision in case Rambus COMP/38.636, decision on 
9 December 2007 and Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. C-3658, Decision 20 May 1996.  
107
 Each European Standard’s reference code contains ‘EN’. For a European Standard to exist, the standard 
must have been adopted by one of the three European Standardization Organizations (ESOs): CEN, 
CENELEC or ETSI. A European Standard must be established by all interested parties through a 
transparent, open and consensus-based process. See CEN at https://www.cen.eu/.  
108
 See European Commission, 2014, p. 31. The framework enlightens the connection between the three 
main actors; 1) the connection between the EU and SSOs; 2) the connection between SSOs and patent 
SSOs 
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SSOs main tasks are to promote technical standards and to evaluate its members’ patented 
technologies. Further, the SSO adopts a standard by declaring it ‘open’ or ‘closed’ – the 
sole difference is that closed standards require royalty licensing whilst open standards 
can be adopted freely. Further, as already mentioned, SSOs have requirements on SEP 
holders in exchange for adopting their technologies.109 A standardization process 
comprises work of stakeholders of the industry in question, where they figure out the 
relevant technical questions in order to decide on the content of a standard. The SSO have 
a couple of core goals, firstly maximizing the technical quality and secondly maximizing 
the adoption by encouraging innovations and R&D and ensure barrier-free 
implementation of the standard by granting licenses under FRAND terms.110 
 
As explained above, with help of figure 3, the Commission co-operates among industries 
for the development of new technologies and supports its competitiveness and ensures 
interoperability between products.111 Despite the benefits standards causes, they may 
reduce competition if a single standard is adopted, whilst similar standards that could 
have been adopted are not. SSOs are however, not considered anti-competitive since they 
put up requirements which ought to help standards avoid anti-competitive results. 
Accordingly, it is mandatory for SSOs to adhere to EU’s laws and regulations, including 
but not limited to, competition law requirements.112 The collaboration within an SSO 
might raise question regarding competition laws, taken into account SSOs associated 
collusion and exclusive risks.  SSOs create a platform for users (competitors) to solve 
technical issues; such collaboration might promote collusion and enforce restrictions on 
products which further results in higher prices and thus restricts consumer’s choice.113  
 
holders; and finally, 3) the connection between the EU and patent holders. The arrows institute the direction 
of influence, although they are two-way relationships. 
109
 Viitanen, 2017, pp. 41–42. Further see Speegle, 2012, p. 849.  
110
 Seppänen, 2017, p. 8.  
111
 White Paper, COM (2009) 324, in Brussels 3.7.2009. p. 1. 
112
 Horizontal Guidelines, 2011. The guidelines have three requirements; transparency, openness and 
effective access to FRAND terms. 
113
 Riis, 2016, pp. 168–169.  
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2.2.2. Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory 
SSO activities may be recognized as a potential source of economic efficiency; SSOs 
promotes and requires both communication and collaboration among its members, that 
would most likely be competitors in the outside market, thus, the standard setting process 
requires caution regarding competition laws. The international and market-wide scope of 
technological agreements within SSOs, might be a potential source of dominant position 
for SEPs holders. However, the risk of such dominant position has contributed with SEP 
implementers requiring SSOs to license technologies adopted in the standard under 
FRAND terms.114 A FRAND commitment requires a SEP holder to voluntarily assimilate 
its patent into a standard and at once the SEP is incorporated into the standard, the holder 
is obliged to license the SEP under FRAND terms to all willing parties i.e potential 
licensees.115 ETSI requires a SEP holder to give promptly, but no more than within three 
months, an irrevocable proposition diligently in writing to grant FRAND licenses or at 
least to the following extent:  
“1) Manufacture, including the right to make or have made customized 
components and sub-systems to the licensee's own design for use in 
manufacture; 2) sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of equipment so 
manufactured; 3) repair, use, or operate equipment; and use methods”116.   
Yet, a FRAND commitment is not a license per se, moreover, it is a non-binding-
commitment for negotiating parties to enter into bona fide negotiations to regulate 
FRAND terms for the license.117  
Members of an SSO i.e. SEP holders, have to commit to license their key IP needed to 
adopt a standard to whomever requests it. The owner of the IP has to either license the 
SEP on a royalty-free basis or under FRAND terms. The question whether FRAND is 
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binding and how serious the commitment actually is has concerned observers; 
accordingly, a royalty-free license is more definite than a FRAND promise.118 FRAND 
commitment provide an assurance to users, that as long as they pay reasonable royalties 
to the SEP holders, they can manufacture products depending on a standard.119 Further, 
the requirements assures the SEP holder benefits when others are using the patent 
(without gaining unfair bargaining), and also facilitates a widespread use of a standard. 
There is actually no regulation governing FRAND obligation, but the SSO require its 
members to follow the terms, in other words, the SEP holders makes a commitment to 
the SSO in question and not to the public. Therefore, difficult problems arise regarding 
whom can indeed carry out a FRAND commitment – national courts have seen SSO 
members as third-party beneficiaries between a SEP holder and an SSO, the question, 
however, is whether non-members who are using the standards can be seen as a third-
party beneficiary?120  
Although SEP holders have agreed to grant license under FRAND terms, they 
successfully use the threat of injunctive relief to hindrance competition and collect higher 
revenue e.g. royalties.121 Although the Horizontal Guidelines is designed to  
“[…] prevent IPR holders from making the implementation of a standard 
difficult by refusing to license or by requesting unfair or unreasonable fees 
after the industry has been locked-in to the standard or by charging 
discriminatory royalty fees.”122  
Henceforth, the practical purposes of FRAND may be described as “1)to prevent refusal 
to supply 2) to prevent patent hold-up and 3) to prevent discriminatory royalty”.123 Yet, 
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the enforceability of FRAND and the meaning of ‘fair’ and reasonable’ has been disputed 
– SEP holders claim that they actually charge whatever the market can deliver regardless 
of FRAND requirements. The terms used are all in connection to competition law 
regulations, specifically abuse of dominant position. Consequently, courts ought to apply 
competition laws in order to enforce FRAND commitments.124  
Generally, SSOs do not determine anything that has to do with the scope of the term 
FRAND, including without limitation, the meaning of FRAND royalties and further, 
SSOs’ licensing principles cannot be identical or applied analogy due to different 
jurisdictions – FRAND commitments are in conjunction with contractual obligations 
which means governing laws regarding licensing will not be uniform. Basically, it means 
that FRAND obligations and commitments are not standardized. The often-used vague 
language within license agreements leaves interpretation-room over licensing terms, 
which should be consistent. Yet, the aim of FRAND requirements is, as stated above, to 
assure that SEP holders do not: i) use the SEP to extort fees from SEP users or demanding 
cross-licensing – licensing terms must be Fair; ii) refuse to license on Reasonable 
licensing fees; and iii) shut out competitors from the market by refusing to license to them 
– the license must be Non-Discriminatory.125  
The question whether FRAND requirements are binding have been discussed in US cases 
Meatswitch, Mircrosoft and Innovatio.126 The evaluation whether SSO commitments are 
legally bound has been viewed from different perspectives; in Meatwsitch the court 
claimed that the assumption of a binding obligation may be seen reasonable, to the extent 
the damages are evaluated in regard to the essence of a FRAND commitment. In 
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Microsoft, on the other hand, the district court’s decision127, was appealed since the claim 
regarded a breach of contract where Microsoft alleged that Motorola had breach its 
obligations to license its SEPs under FRAND terms, due to Motorola’s commitments to 
an SSO. In Innovatio the question at issue, was whether FRAND commitments are 
inherited by an acquiring party when an entity acquires a SEP that is committed to an 
SSO, the court affirmed that the SEP is subject to FRAND commitment.  
Although the mentioned cases are viewed from different perspectives, they all have one 
factor in common regarding the legality of FRAND commitments –  the commitment one 
does to an SSO is seen as a legally binding contract. The commitment one does to an SSO 
can be seen as a ‘declaration’ or ‘letter of assurance’. Jakobs, on the other hand, claim 
that a possible FRAND obligation should simply be seen as a result of an independent 
contract between the parties i.e. the SEP holder and the SSO. According to Jakobs, the 
FRAND commitment is undoubtedly voluntary in the following two ways: i) a SEP 
holder does not have to become a member in an SSO, which indicates that a SEP holder 
has all the right to decline a membership and thus has no obligations thereunder; ii)  
members of an SSO are requested and not required to license under FRAND terms and 
may evaluate whether he or she wishes to act accordingly on a patent-by-patent basis. 
Yet, ETSI requires its members to provide, in writing, a declaration of a commitment to 
license under FRAND terms.128  
The requirement to license the SEP on ‘Reasonable’ royalty is not tied to a fixed price, 
henceforth, it is rather difficult to know whether the license fulfills the ‘Reasonable-
requirement. Since the term is as vague as it is, SEP holders still charge excessive 
royalties due to lack of definition of the expression. SSOs do not take part in the license 
negotiations processes, which further leads to the obliviousness of knowing the license 
terms i.e. the royalty fees. Further, since there is a lack of transparency within the SSO 
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and FRAND licensing, it may be challenging for a licensee to calculate the royalty fee 
for the sake of evaluating whether the royalty is reasonable or not, especially when Non-
disclosure agreements (NDA) are usually attached to a license agreement.129 
Article 102 TFEU, which enhances abuse of dominant position, prohibits: “directly or 
indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading 
conditions”130, which translates into explaining during which circumstances a SEP 
holder might abuse its dominant position by e.g. imposing unfair conditions to the 
licensee. In case United brands v. Commission, the ECJ held, that by charging a price that 
lacks reasonable affiliation to the actual determined economic value of said device, is 
seen as an abuse since the undertaking by someone in a dominant position, directly or 
indirectly, sells the products over market value131, which further translates into to the 
above printed Article. Further, in case Scandliens Sverige AB v. Port of Helsingborg132 
the Commission held that one has to consider two questions to define the reasonableness 
of a price: first, is there an extensive contrast between the cost and price and second, are 
competing products within the same price range.133 Unsuccessfully, neither European 
courts nor the Commission has suggested an equivalent boundary of when the profits 
becomes excessive.134   
Quite a few scholars have discussed what a patent holder needs to do/not to do to in order 
to fulfill the ‘fair and reasonable’ commitment:  
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i) “not charge more than the cumulative value of the product over the next 
best technical alternative”;135 ii) “not negotiate for a royalty-free-cross-
license”;136 iii) “base the royalty rate on a mathematical proportion of all 
SEPs to the practice of standard”;137 iv) “not request royalty rates after the 
standard has been adopted”;138 and v) “not seek injunctive relief against a 
standard implementer if they fail to agree on the license terms”.139 
The debate whether FRAND commitment is binding, and the meaning of excessive on a 
royalty scale, and the right to enforce injunction against a SEP implementer is still 
ambiguous and lacks a coherent answer – the solution to the debates is to jointly agree on 
the contractual commitment FRAND illustrates. If FRAND commitment can be seen as 
a legally binding contract, then contract law principles are applied, which further means 
that methods of contract interpretation shall be used to deal with mentioned issues. 
According to Jakobs, if a FRAND commitment is seen as a contract and therefore taken 
seriously, then we could develop cumulative royalty cap, formulas calculating royalties, 
limitations on remedies against infringements, all with a basis due to contractual 
interpretation.140  
2.2.3. Non-practicing entities & Patent trolls 
 
Briefly explained, non-practicing entities (NPEs) also known as patent trolls, are by 
definition, according to Chien et al., companies that do not produce any goods 
themselves, rather their business model is to claim patents by traditionally using the threat 
of injunctive relief to reach a settlement with the infringer on royalties.141 Their business 
model and revenue is established by licensing and further, infringement actions. Thus, 
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they are in the need for SSOs to adopt their technologies in order to become owners of a 
SEP, where after they bypass the FRAND obligations.142 Since NPEs are not producing 
any goods themselves their business model is to hide their patents and claim royalties / 
infringements after a standard is adopted.143 
 
The expression ‘patent troll’ describes well the companies’ intentions; instead of actively 
making use or developing of their inventions, they let them sit unused until they find 
someone who may use their technology and thereupon,  demand royalties for the use. If 
the users refuse to pay royalties, they usually go to court.144 Yet, for example Nokia has 
been called a patent troll even though they are certainly not; Nokia has contributed with 
millions of dollars in R&D in order to create the software we use today and additionally, 
prior to that, they produced and sold their own cellphones. The patent troll accusation is 
based on Nokia’s business model today, which is licensing. Yet, they license the same 
technology they created during the time they produced cellphones and, therefore, they 
cannot be accused to be a patent troll even though they simply license patents 
nowadays.145 
 
Larson defines NPEs as: “individuals or entities that initiate business models entirely 
around purchasing, acquiring, or filing for their own patent rights, and enforcing those 
patent rights to generate revenues.” Further, Larson claims that it has been difficult to 
agree on the definition of the expression by academics – the NPE was created as a 
courtesy way to address ‘patent trolls.146 In Highland Plastics, Inc. v. Sorensen 
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Research147 the defendant demanded that the plaintiff removes the word ‘troll’ from the 
complaint, since the expression did not have any conjunction with the alleged claims and 
is not degrading. However, the judge denied the defendant’s request since the expression 
is commonly used and understood in patent litigation.148  
 
2.3. Competition laws regarding licensing 
 
If SSOs and SEP holders cannot agree on what FRAND terms actually mean, within a 
license agreement (note the prohibition of talking about licensing terms within an SSO), 
does the SEP holder have the right to seek injunction to stop an infringement, due to 
exclusive rights provided under IP law, even though it is not evident what lies within the 
license agreement? As Pitkämäki argues, the focus is laid on Article 102 TFEU – to what 
extent does Article 102 restrict IP abuse and can ownership of a SEP result in a dominant 
position in the market?149 In a recent case, the Commission fined Qualcomm €242 
millions for exercising in predatory pricing.150 The case begun already in 2005 when 
Nokia, Ericsson and Panasonic alleged that Qualcomm had abused its dominant market 
position and further, not licensed under FRAND terms under ETSI policy.151 Yet, the 
commission has not agreed to delve deeper into deciding on what constitutes FRAND 
and what is seen excessive in the context of FRAND commitments.152  
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An abuse of dominant position, as managed in Article 102 and mentioned above, needs 
to be assessed in casu whether the Article applies or not on the case. One has to start by 
defining the relevant market, since an abuse of dominant position can only exist in one 
relevant market i.e. proposing unfair royalty rates for a licensee in another business / 
market is not seen as an abuse of Article 102. The market is based on both geographical 
and product indicators: i) a geographical market means that the abuse has to take place in 
an area where homogenous legislation applies i.e. EU; and ii) a product market means 
that an abuse may take place if the products can be substitutes for each other.153 Abuse 
of dominant position will distinctively be discussed here on after, focusing on explicit 
markets where an abuse is considered colossal and may have substantial effects.  
 
When a SEP is adopted into a widely harmonized standard, the SEP receives a significant 
market power; the SEP engages all the standard users automatically when the standard is 
set.154 As stated above, contract law principles applies on SEP licensing under FRAND 
terms, if a SEP holder agrees to the obligation, since FRAND obligation is voluntary. 
Even though the obligation is voluntary (exception ETSI), competition rules applies on 
SEP licensing due to its important and considerable part within an industry. In other 
words, due to the fact that a SEP holder ship may result in a dominant market position, 
the SEP holder ought to follow FRAND licensing, even though he or she did not agree 
on it during the standard setting process. Atik explains the interpretation well:  
 
“Operation of the Intellectual Property (“IP”)-related “essential facilities 
doctrine” under Article 102 TFEU may justify the imposition of remedies that 
resemble FRAND regardless of the presence or absence of a FRAND 
declaration by the intellectual property rights holder.”155  
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2.3.1. EU regulations on competition law  
 
Competition law principals on a European level are featured in Article 102 of the TFEU 
– the article establishes what constitutes an abuse of dominant market position between 
member states. The scope of the term ‘abuse of dominant position’ is imperative in SEP 
licensing, as will further be developed below. Article 102 states as follows:  
 
 “(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other 
unfair trading conditions; (b) limiting production, markets or technical 
development to the prejudice of consumers; (c) applying dissimilar conditions 
to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at 
a competitive disadvantage; (d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to 
acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their 
nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the 
subject of such contracts.”156 
 
Part a) and c) of Article 102 is written in the sense that the former regards ‘fair and 
reasonable’ and the latter ‘non-discriminatory’ in the scope of FRAND. As Xiaowen 
points out, if FRAND is a mirror-image of Article 102, then the FRAND commitment per 
se is in vain, but if FRAND contains stricter requirements than Article 102, then the 
FRAND commitment should be simply enough. Yet it is unknown, as previously 
mentioned, how FRAND should be interpreted and what the obligations mean per se. It 
should not be understood, that complying with FRAND, means complying with 
competition law and vice versa – each case have to be decided in casu whether a SEP 
holder abuses its dominant position under Article 102, or if the claimed violations is not 
seen as a breach of a FRAND commitment.157 Due to this ambiguousness, it is necessary 
to examine each subject matter separately and define to what extent they complement 
each other and how it is dealt with de facto in practice. 
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Market power is a useful tool when determining whether competition law principles 
and/or FRAND commitments has been breached, and further identify competition law 
sources. According to the ECJ, by simply owning a SEP, holders do not put themselves 
in the position where they would be considered as abusive.158  Accordingly, the ECJ held 
in cases United brands and Hoffman-La Roche that a dominant market position is derived 
from different factors which means, that by simply owning a SEP, which is part of a 
highly fundamental standard, does not implicate that the SEP holder automatically abuses 
a dominant market position.159 Even though Article 102 and a FRAND commitment 
operate as independent sources, competition law principles are imposed when a party 
refuses to license its SEP on fairly and reasonably terms e.g. a SEP holder charges 
excessive royalties from the SEP user. Yet, there is no definition of what ‘excessive’ 
actually mean, thus, we cannot evaluate whether the royalty imposes abuse of the FRAND 
commitment and/or Article 102. Therefore, it is imperative and inevitable to examine case 
law in order to define the scope of Article 102 and its conjunction to FRAND 
commitment.  
 
In a joint copyright case from the ECJ, the court held that in some scenarios an IPR owner 
is obliged to license the IPR (compulsory license). The court upheld a decision from the 
Commission where a group of Irish broadcasters were obliged to license on non-
discriminatory basis. The Irish broadcaster groups had refused to license essential IP-
protected material to the development of a new product; hence, the refusal was an abuse 
of their dominant position and therefore a violation of Article 102.160 Atik comments the 
case as follows:  
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“The refusal to license a copyright in these circumstances constitutes the 
violation of TFEU 102—an actionable abuse of a dominant position. A 
FRAND-like licensing obligation is the remedy for this violation”161.  
 
As previously discussed, the FRAND obligation is a so called ‘voluntary commitment’, 
yet the ECJ sets guidelines which refers to the fact that an IPR owner (as well as a SEP 
holder) have to license their essential IPR on a non-discriminatory basis.  In a similar case 
Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, the court held that Article 102 was violated by Microsoft 
due to the fact that Microsoft refused to license interoperability information to its 
competitors in the Windows work group server market. An IPR-license have to be made 
available in situations where competition laws are concerned and where technical 
development is prevented due to the refusal to license. Further, a similar FRAND-like 
commitment was demanded on Microsoft as a remedy for its violation of Article 102.162 
 
IPR laws do not give a carte blanche to violate competition law principles, in other words, 
by owning an IPR one does not receive immunity from being accused of a violation of 
competition laws. There are tensions between the European competition law and patent 
law due to diverse interpretations163 – as discussed earlier, the EU lacks a conjointly 
working legislation. Further, it complicates the competition law’s principles role – the 
EU needs a unitary relationship between competition principles and patent rules. Patent 
rules have been based on national laws and interpretations, while competition principles 
are embedded in EU treaties. If EU reaches some kind of unitary patent system, the 
dilemma between the two will automatically be fixed if the patent system is compatible 
with our existing competition principles.164 Moreover, until we reach amended patent 
legislation on an European level that  co-exist and is compatible with our competition law 
principles, we have to rely on case law from both national courts and the ECJ. Yet the 
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ongoing plan for the unitary patent system may not be a solution per se, we still might 
need an alternative legislative change, perhaps within TFEU in defining abuse of 
dominant position from a patent perspective? 
 
As explained, before one can assess whether a company abuses its dominant market 
position one has to define the relevant market.165 The determination of what is part of the 
same market and further, does it constitute a dominant position raises a lot of concerns 
regarding theoretical and practical difficulties, which the European Commission have to 
take into consideration in casu and with fresh eyes. As already established and as 
Väisänen points out, an interesting future question is indeed whether the EU will adapt 
their interpretations of Article 102 in order to apply it to FRAND commitment.166 Unless 
the EU finds a way to adopt Article 102, Member States have to, by themselves, find a 
common ground for what ‘excessive’ mean in the light of the ECJ judgments.  
 
2.3.2. Seeking Injunctions 
 
An injunction functions as a remedy, ordered by a court, to prohibit the continuation of 
the IPR infringements. An IPR holder has the right to seek injunctive relief under the IP 
Enforcement Directive. 167 According to Xiaowen an injunction sought by a SEP holder 
is quite controversial; licensing a SEP means that anyone using the standard, in which the 
SEP is implemented, has the same right to primarily, enter into licensing negotiations, 
and secondary, into a licensing agreement under FRAND terms, therefore, the threat of 
seeking injunctions may raise antitrust concerns.168 Scholars have proposed a so called 
‘waiver theory’ which refers to the fact that a SEP holder who has licensed under FRAND 
terms waivers its right to seek injunctions. If the theory were true, then anyone could 
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basically use the SEP without paying a single royalty. Anyhow, the theory lacks legal 
basis in both law and regulations and in case law.169   
 
An interesting case regarding seeking injunction is the Orange Book Standard case in 
which Sony and Philips had developed CD-Rs and CD-RWs. The elements within the 
patents were never accepted during a standard setting process. However, the products had 
already become a de facto170 standard without containing any SEPs. Moreover, since 
there were no SEPs involved, there had not been any negotiations regarding FRAND 
terms. However, the court held that the defendant could be granted a so-called FRAND 
defense in order to avoid injunction, if the defendant: 1) makes an unconditional license 
offer with terms the IP owner could not refuse; and 2) propose a license agreement with 
adequate counting of payment if the defendant was already using the IP. The defendant 
did not fulfill the set requirements which lead to the plaintiff was granted the right to seek 
injunction.171  
 
The case lead to other German courts applying the same standards requiring the defendant 
to waive their own defense concerning non-infringement, resulting in the FRAND 
defense being quite unappealing, not only in de facto cases, but also in de jure.172 In the 
Netherlands, variously, the District Court in The Hague rejected the FRAND defense on 
the following grounds: i) the fact that the defendant is intitled to compulsory license 
would mean that the owner of the IPR cannot enforce its rights; ii) by allowing the 
defendant’s reasoning it would mean that users can enforce patens prior to obtaining a 
license; and iii) the defendant should have requested a license prior to the use of the patent 
 
169
 Geradin, Damien et al., 2007, p. 117.  
170
 As explained on page 6, a de facto standard is a standard adopted by the public without having been 
adopted by an SSO. Compare de jure standard which is established by stakeholders and SSOs. See Torti, 
2015, pp. 50–52.  
171
 Case KZR 39/06 Orane Book Standard, German federal Court of Justice, judgment 6 May 2009.  
172
 Pitkämäki, 2016, p. 55.  
 44 
 
 
and if the IPR owner had refused the license, then the defendant would have had the right 
to proceed for obtaining a compulsory license.173  
 
2.4. Conclusion 
 
As discussed, and discovered during this lengthy chapter, it is imperative to understand 
the basics and backgrounds to various elements that create and combine both SEPs and 
the issues that relies within. During this chapter the basics of software protection and 
licensing has been discussed which contributed with the examination of SEPs and further 
FRAND terms, not to mention the issues that follows of Article 102 TFEU. All of the 
mentioned elements are part of a greater complex which constitutes the basis of whole 
technological communities and organizations that establish rules that we ought to obey in 
order to participate in the aforementioned.  
 
The interpretation of FRAND has been extensively addressed – while we are concerning 
us on how to interpret the expression, it is easy to forget about the fact that the term in 
itself may vary from country to country. As previously mentioned, FRAND, as an 
expression, is widely used within Europe, but in the US, for example, the expression is 
addressed as RAND, leaving out the ‘fair’ part. What does it mean in practice that ‘fair’ 
is left out? Since the FRAND expression does not have an official definition, one cannot 
answer the question whether which of the expression is ‘the right one’. One can only 
imagine the issues, both in arbitration and litigation way, the word ‘fair’ may cause. 
Accordingly, not only Europe, but the world needs a unitary SEP licensing system which 
allows holders to grant licenses on the same basis throughout the world. Yet, the future 
is quite uncertain in reaching such goal, due to the fact that the expression is already now 
harmonized differently due to varying interpretations.  
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As discussed, a SEP holder is obliged to license under FRAND terms, or at least, in 
accordance with Article 102 TFEU to avoid abuse, but is there an obligation to license to 
every component manufacturer of a product or simply to the end-user? For clarification, 
when e.g. Apple manufacture an iPhone, they use several components from different 
producers and licenses SEPs from other innovators, thus, the question arises whether the 
SEP holders is obliged to solely license the SEP under FRAND terms to Apple (the end-
user), or to every single producer who has manufactured components which are part of 
the end-product, the iPhone. From the SEP holder’s perspective, it would be more 
profitable to only license the SEP under FRAND terms to the end-user whilst the 
component manufacturers consider that the SEP holder have to license to everyone who 
asks, as is the original meaning of FRAND.  
 
To conclude this chapter and the issues the EU faces, it is only essential to include them: 
i) the discussion whether FRAND obligation is compulsory and further, what laws and 
principles governs it; ii) the definition of FRAND and what can be seen as excessive 
royalties and non-discriminatory; and iii) the lack of a unitary patent system that 
conjointly works with EU legislation i.e. Article 102 TFEU. The sole measure to avoid 
future confusion and contrasting interpretations is for the EU to solve these issues by e.g. 
adopting and putting into force a unitary patent systen made under the TFEU and from 
there develop a comprehensive definition of FRAND, which further will support the 
solving of the correlating issues. The issues will be discussed further on in the thesis, 
along with the upcoming policy recommendations that will be extensively discussed in 
chapter four ‘Analysis and discussion’, after the case analyzation of Huawei Technologies 
v. ZTE which is, as mentioned, a contributing factor to the interpretations circling around 
Europe.  
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3. Procedural framework for SEP negotiations  
3.1. Introduction 
 
In 2015, the ECJ gave a preliminary ruling, requested by the Landgericht Düsseldorf (the 
German Federal Court of Justice) under Article 267 TFEU, regarding the interpretation 
of Article 102 TFEU apropos abuse of dominant position in license negotiation of a 
SEP174. The ruling provided fundamental guidance for SEP licensing, that are subject to 
FRAND commitment.175 Furthermore, the ruling enumerates certain steps that ought to 
be followed during SEP licensing negotiations. The case is being analyzed due to the 
importance it brought to national courts, or would it be more appropriate to say, the 
confusion it created. By cause of,  the thesis will analyze the case further by tearing down 
the background of the case, the proceedings, the judgement and follow-up cases in 
pursuance of understanding the cause for the interpretations, and additionally, reaching 
the core objective of the thesis by providing possible policy recommendations for 
emerging issues. 
 
The case was brought before the ECJ by Huawei against ZTE, both being Chinese 
technology companies. The case was brought before the court in Germany, due to the fact 
that ZTE was marketing products, which assimilated software in conjunction to the LTE 
standard.176  Huawei and ZTE had, in fact, entered into licensing negotiations in 
pursuance of reaching an agreement, under FRAND terms, for the use of Huawei’s patent, 
but they never reached a compromise regarding royalties. Due to the inability of reaching 
an agreement, Huawei brought an action before the Landgericht Düsseldorf for the 
infringement of its SEP, since ZTE had used/continued to use the SEP without a license 
agreement. Huawei pursued in the claim: i) an injunction in pursuance of prohibiting the 
 
174
 The SEP in question is patent application EP 2 090 050 B1 “method and apparatus of establishing a 
synchronization signal in a communication system”, date of filing 29.04.2008.  
175
 C-170/13 
176
 The patent was filed to ETSI in 2009 under which Huawei gave commitment to granting licenses under 
FRAND terms. See Opinion of the Advocate General M. Wathelet, delivered on November 20, 2014 in 
case C-170/13, paragraph 5.  
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continuation of the infringement; ii) an order for the rendering of accounts; iii) he recall 
of products; and iv) an award of damages.177 ZTE’s defense, before the court, was that 
Huawei abuses its dominant position by seeking injunction whilst ZTE is willing to 
negotiate a license of the use of Huawei’s SEP.  
 
The Advocate General Wathelet gave his opinion on the case on 20th November 2014, 
prior to ECJ’s ruling, concluding that a SEP holder have to give a notice to the infringer 
of the infringement, and providing a license offer complying with FRAND terms. Where 
after, the infringer must respond promptly to the offer in a diligent manner, either by 
accepting the offer or by presenting a counteroffer.178 According to the Advocate 
General, a legal action or claim does not per se constitute a dominant position: 
 
“The fact that the SEP-holder takes legal action to secure the rendering of 
accounts does not constitute an abuse of a dominant position. It is for the 
national court in question to ensure that the measure is reasonable and 
proportionate. The fact that the SEP-holder brings a claim for damages for 
past acts of use for the sole purpose of obtaining compensation for previous 
infringements of its patent does not constitute an abuse of a dominant 
position.”179 
 
The ECJ follows the Advocate General’s opinion but in a more extensive way; the ECJ 
start by distinguishing between i) seeking a prohibitory injunction or recalling of products 
and ii) rendering of accounts and award of damages. The latter will not have an effect on 
competitive products still being manufacturer and appearing on the market.180 The ECJ 
held that the former, on the other hand, will not constitute an abuse of Article 102 TFEU, 
 
177
 C-170/13, paragraphs 27. 
178
 Opinion of the Advocate General M. Wathelet, C-170/13, paragraph 103. 
179
 Ibid. paragraph 103.  It is also fair to acknowledge that the ECJ never investigated Huawei’s dominant 
position  per se since it was not disputed at any point. See paragraphs 53-58. 
180
 C-170/13, paragraphs 72-75.  
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in case the SEP holder has given a FRAND commitment to an SSO, provided, however, 
that before the SEP holder brings the action, the SEP holder has (see below)181:  
 
1) Alerted the infringer of the alleged infringement by letting the infringer know in 
which way it has been infringed; 
2) Provided a license agreement under FRAND terms, after the infringer has 
expressed its willingness to license; and 
3) The infringer continues to infringe the patent and has not promptly given a 
response to the license offer in accordance with good faith. 
 
Furthermore, the ECJ held that the 
possible infringer, who has not accepted 
the SEP holder’s offer, may only invoke 
the prohibitory injunction / recall of 
products if the infringer has submitted 
diligently, promptly and in writing, a 
specific enough counteroffer under 
FRAND.182 Although the ECJ’s ruling  
answers the questions  inquired, the 
ruling leaves room for further 
discussion and analysis on the subject. 
 
Figure 4.183 
Procedural framework 
for actions against SEP infringement 
 
 
181
 Ibid. paragraph 83–86.  
182
 Kuhnen K. Rainer;  Huawei v ZTE – ECJ sets framework for injunctive relief regarding SEPs found at 
www.iam-media.com, 11 April 2016.  
183
 Ibid., 2016,  Kuhnen K. Rainer. The figure shows the actions a SEP holder and a willing licensee/alleged 
infringer have to take in order to seek an injunction/ receive a FRAND defense.  
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3.2. Legal issues arising out of the procedural framework 
 
The ruling has set a procedural framework for possible actions against infringers of SEPs, 
especially to SEP holders seeking injunctive relief as explained in figure 4. The 
framework somewhat supports infringers from SEP holders’ threats with injunction, 
provided that the users of the standard are willing to take a license, and vice versa, an 
infringer has to diligently agree to a FRAND license promptly and in written, before 
accusing a SEP holder of abuse of Article 102 TFEU, and further, its dominant position. 
The ruling is a fairly good compromise between the Orange Book Standard184 regarding 
a de facto standard decision and Commissions Motorola and Samsung185 decision 
regarding a de jure standard. Furthermore, the case raised several issues at the coalition 
between patent law and competition law – when is it legitimate for competition law 
regulations to trespass on exclusive IPR rights?186 
 
Moreover, the ECJ considered that a SEP holder must, at its best ability, prior to seeking 
an injunction, ensure that an equal harmony is achieved between the parties, in order to 
not abuse its dominant position under Article 102 TFEU.187 Yet, the ruling lacked the 
answer to what might happen when the parties’ offers are not FRAND compliant – is it 
still an possibility to seek an injunction due to the fact that the infringer did not make a 
FRAND compliant counteroffer or is it simply an abuse since the SEP holder’s offer was 
not acceptable from the very beginning.188 As expressed earlier, the infringer would 
naturally invoke the so-called FRAND defense.189 
 
 
184
 Case KZR 39/06, judgment 6 May 2009. 
185
 See Commissions decision 2014; The Commission held that is was an abuse of dominant position to 
enforce an injunction while there is a willing licensee who agreed to the terms. 
186
 Jones, 2014, p. 2. 
187
 C-170/13, paragraphs 48-55. 
188
 Pitkämäki, 2016, p. 70.  
189
 See on page 38 ‘FRAND-defense’.  
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The ECJ simply disclosed that if the parties cannot reach an agreeable outcome on 
royalties, an independent third party should determine the royalty if both parties agree to 
it, otherwise the only way to proceed is by enforcing the injunction.190 Sadly, the ECJ left 
the Landgericht Düsseldorf to determine the questions whether Huawei actually abused 
its dominant position under Article 102 TFEU by seeking injunction relief, despite its 
FRAND promise.191 By not giving a clear guideline on the matter, and since there are no 
cases that could be in correlation to be applied to the case, the ECJ’s ruling lead to national 
courts interpreting the case differently. 
 
Although, the ruling of the court is vague, the ECJ demonstrated guidelines, a set of rules, 
regulating parties’ negotiation process the parties ought to follow, in order to not breach 
Article 102 TFEU, and hence, the case was distinguished from previous cases.192 The 
ECJ basically classified the FRAND commitment as a circumstance that could limit the 
SEP holder’s right to injunctive relief.193 According to Tsilikas, the strict requirements in 
the affirmation of SEPs, will raise the bar for court’s to grant injunctions against users 
that are willing to license, and further, it provides guidelines for licensor and licensee for 
future licensing negotiations.194  
 
Furthermore, the ruling provides a preference for FRAND determination regarding 
licensing negotiations between licensor and licensee; the ECJ reveals incentives to all 
involved in the FRAND licensing negotiations to achieve an agreeable outcome through 
prompt good-faith bargaining.195 The court uses competition liability and enforcement of 
injunctions as levers, in order to uphold opportunism by both parties.196 The court simply 
 
190
 C-170/13, paragraphs 66-69. 
191
 Ibid., paragraph 70.  
192
 Ibid., paragraph 48.  
193
 Ibid., paragraph 51–53. 
194
 Tsilikas, 2017, pp. 47–48. 
195
 Lundqvist, 2015, p. 391. 
196
 Petit, 2015, p. 6. 
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seeks to strengthen licensing negotiations by imposing competition law liability on SEP 
holders – the  requirement for a SEP holder to i) inform the infringer of the infringement 
and of what patent is being infringed, ii) submit a formal written offer and iii) propose a 
royalty rate based under FRAND, provides strong incentives for SEP holders to e.g. 
develop licensing programs harmonizing FRAND.197 
 
As Tsilikas continues to argue, an important question national courts have to decide by 
interpreting the case, is whether the ruling is to be followed step-by-step or by a 
cumulative approach. A step-by-step basis means that if the patent holder fails to e.g. 
submit a FRAND offer, injunctive relief will automatically be seen as an abuse despite 
the behavior of the licensee. A cumulative approach, on the other hand, suggests that in 
case the patent holder fails to comply with the requirements, the licensee still have to 
meet its requirements in order for the licensor to abuse Article 102 TFEU.198 A 
cumulative approach is only natural, since if courts are to apply the step-by-step approach, 
licensees will never agree on taking a license. However, courts should always decide in 
casu which approach is to be used, taken into account all aspects i.e. the offer, the 
counteroffer, promptness and bona fide.  
 
SSOs should take the ruling into account – a framework of consistent rules have to be 
established199, which would further contribute with successful licensing negotiations. 
SSOs should collaborate in creating a policy reform based on the ruling’s negotiation 
framework, in order to reach a solution that would fit the market – SSOs ought to have 
more ‘power’ within defining FRAND by providing a set of consistent rules how to 
negotiate a license, not simply that the license have to be ‘under FRAND terms’, which 
would further contribute with better performance of collaborative standardization.  
Henceforth, the ruling could actually be seen as a chance for the European Commission 
 
197
 Tsilikas, 2017, p. 21. 
198
 Ibid., p. 22. 
199
 Opinion of the Advocate General M. Wathelet, C-170/13, paragraph 11. 
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to reassess its policy regarding the enforcement and implementation of Article 102 in 
FRAND disputes.200  
 
Furthermore, the Commission should additionally take into account Advocate General’s 
opinion and criticism regarding Motorola and Samsung decision, that the Commission’s 
decision resulted in under-protection of IP.201 The Huawei ruling wished to foster 
bilateral negotiations, renouncing the Commission’s ‘broad safe harbor’202 approach in 
which possible licensees would decline to negotiate in bona fide and not care about 
increased litigation costs nor uncertainty. Therefore, the ruling marks a culmination in 
the operation of EU competition law within SEP licensing.  The Court based its ruling on 
the belief that private parties are more likely to establish FRAND during sealed licensing 
negotiations by themselves and that a court’s ruling ought to be the ultimate last resort 
after the parties fail to agree on an acceptable and pleasant fallout.203 
 
As discussed above, the case brought both some positive and negative approaches to 
patent licensing.  The ruling created the aforementioned guidelines for SEP holders 
seeking injunctive relief, yet, as Advocate General Wathelet expressed, it is for the 
national courts to decide, whether the actions taken are reasonable and propriate.204 From 
one point of view, the guided framework can be seen as a positive aspect of the ruling, 
however, the fact that the ECJ did not firmly assess consistent guidelines on: i) to what 
extent the guidelines should be followed; ii) what happens in the situations where the 
guidelines are not followed; iii) how should FRAND be interpreted; iv) what is seen as 
an ‘excessive’ royalty rate; and v) what constitutes an abuse of Article 102 TFEU.  
 
200
 Tsilikas, 2017, p. 24. 
201
 Opinion of the Advocate General M. Wathelet, C-170/13, paragraph 50 – 51. 
202
 A safe harbor concept is a provision which reduces liability when particular conditions have been met. 
See www.investopedia.com.   
203
 Tsilikas, 2017, p. 25. 
204
 Opinion of the Advocate General M. Wathelet, C-170/13, paragraph 103. 
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Due to the fact that the ECJ did not conclude the meaning of FRAND, licensing parties 
cannot really know whether they are complying with the requirements or not i.e. the 
expression that the licensee have to “diligently respond”205 in compliance with 
“recognized commercial practices in the field”206, leaves quite a lot of space for 
interpretation.  Furthermore, Commissioner Vestager and Lundqvist have both interpreted 
the ECJ’s Huawei ruling on a following basis. According to their interpretation, the right 
to seek an injunction should be removed from a SEP holder, who has committed 
themselves to license under FRAND terms, in case there is a willing licensee.207 
According to Petit, Vestager’s opinion is based on paragraph 53 of the ruling208:  
 
“In those circumstances, and having regard to the fact that an undertaking 
to grant licences on FRAND terms creates legitimate expectations on the part 
of third parties that the proprietor of the SEP will in fact grant licences on 
such terms, a refusal by the proprietor of the SEP to grant a licence on those 
terms may, in principle, constitute an abuse within the meaning of Article 102 
TFEU.”209 
 
It is understandable, and might even be true, that Petit believes Commissioner Vestager 
bases her opinion solely on paragraph 53, since the paragraph clearly states that a FRAND 
commitment constitutes ‘legitimate expectations’ for third parties. Yet, due to the 
vagueness of the expression, FRAND cannot be seen as groundwork for the formation of 
legitimate expectations.210 As Petit points out, legitimate expectations can only be 
expected when the administration gives explicit assurances.211 Further, in the case of 
 
205
 C-170/13, paragraphs 65. 
206
 Ibid., paragraph 67. 
207
 Commissioner Vestager’s speech, 11 September 2015 and Lundqvist, 2015, p. 391.  
208
 Petit, 2015, pp. 4-5. 
209
 C-170/13, paragraphs 53. 
210
 Seppänen, 2017, p. 55. 
211
 Petit, 2015, p. 38. 
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Branco v. Commission212, the court regulated three conditions that have to be met for 
legitimate expectation to be fulfilled: “1) precise, unconditional and consistent 
assurances must be given; 2) those assurances must be such as to give rise to actual 
legitimate expectations; and 3) the assurances given must comply with the applicable 
rules”213. Can FRAND at all constitute such an assurance as mentioned above? – in the 
light of Huawei ruling yes. As discussed earlier, the FRAND commitment is not 
compulsory and does not put any obligations to actually license under FRAND terms, it 
is more of a suggestion or incentive to avoid abuse of dominant position.  
 
As already mentioned above, the ruling leaves out the question of what the true meaning 
of a FRAND commitment is –  is it solely used, inter alia, as a basis for the parties to 
calculate royalties bona fide or does the commitment also contribute with providing fair 
compensation. The court left out crucial answers to the questions requested by the 
referring court i.e. the court did not answer the question of ‘what is seen as abuse’ they 
rather answered, ‘what is not seen as abuse’.214  Due to the lack of establishing ‘what is 
seen as abuse’, the case has received a great amount of critique – a SEP holder has pretty 
much always the stronger position towards the licensee and, therefore, it is shocking that 
the court did not assess what constitutes an abuse of such dominance. Further, critics have 
criticized the ruling on the following basis; the ruling does not take into account SSO’s 
rules regarding licensing negotiations, and specifically royalty negotiations215, which 
further leads to patent pooling and cross-licensing.216 
 
The dilemma between de facto and de jure standards217, as seen in the Orange Book 
ruling, should not be applied on the Huawei ruling. It is inevitable, that in the Huawei 
 
212
 Eugénio Branco, Ldq v. Commission (T347/03),  judgement given on 30 June 2005 
213
 Seppänen, 2017, p. 55 and T347/03, paragraph 102.  
214
 Pitkämäki, 2016, p. 78. 
215
 Farrell et al., 2007, p. 630. 
216
 Galli, 2015, p. 194. 
217
 Supra note 170.  
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ruling, the patents were indeed essential to a certain standard, and therefore, FRAND-
encumbered, taken as a main rule. However, whilst in other cases where the standards are 
not administered by any SSO, the FRAND commitment is not imposed218, with an 
exception in the Microsoft case, in which the commission held that it was abuse of 
dominant position, regardless of being a SEP or not, but simply due to the importance of 
the technology involved and the prevention of others from accomplishing technological 
development. Therefore, the Huawei ruling should not be applied analogy to cases which 
handles de facto standards. Ultimately, the Huawei ruling should be interpreted as an 
incomparable ruling, it assessed a procedural framework for licensing negotiations, which 
imposes duties on both parties219, whilst previous cases regarding abuse of dominant 
position has not established as specific guidelines as the Huawei ruling, rather solely 
certain steps that ought to have been taken for the avoidance of abuse of dominant 
position.220   
 
3.3. Interpretation of the procedural framework in Germany and the United 
Kingdom 
 
The ruling has had important implications, not only for national courts around Europe, 
but also for SSOs and the European Commission’s policies. The main concern has, 
however, been with the national court’s interpretation of the ruling – they face difficulties 
of applying the guidelines in practice. Especially German courts face difficulties (the 
ruling was requested by the Landgericht Düsseldorf in the first place), since they are 
forced to change from legal standards, they have been using for several years, to the 
requirements set in the Huawei case. One important aspect to lift up already now, is the 
fact that all of the German rulings favored the SEP holder and refused to examine whether 
the procedural framework were met. In addition to German rulings, two UK rulings will 
 
218
 Seppänen, 2017, p. 61 see further Larouche et al., 2017, p. 31.  
219
 Ibid., 2017, p. 20. 
220
 See joined Cases C-241/91P & C-242/91P and IMS Health v. NDC Health (C-418/01), judgement on 
29 April 2004.  
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be analyzed.221 All the mentioned cases have faced some of the following issues which 
will be further discussed below: i) can an injunction take effect if the licensee is willing 
to take license; ii) does all the requirements of the Huawei ruling have to be met, and if 
one is not met, can a court dismisses the case; and iii) in what case does a royalty rate 
abuse FRAND. 
 
In Sisvel v. Haier222, the parties failed to reach an agreeable licensing negotiation 
outcome, which led to Sisvel issuing an infringement action against Haier. The Higher 
Regional Court in Düsseldorf (appellate court) held in Sisvel v. Haier that in order to 
determine whether a license is FRAND-encumbered, each license term have to be closely 
examined by a court.223 Beforehand, the Regional Court issued an injunctive relief since 
Haier had failed to comply with the procedural framework set up by the Huawei ruling. 
Moreover, the court held that the licensee was not ‘willing’ to enter into a license 
agreement and therefore, it was irrelevant to investigate whether the Huawei requirements 
were met or not.224 The case was de facto appealed, where after the Higher Regional 
Court blamed the Regional Court for a misguided ruling, by not investigating whether the 
Huawei requirements were met, as previously stated. Accordingly, the case was 
appointed back to the District Court.  
  
 
221
 The cases that will be analyzed are Saint Lawrence Communications v. Telekom Deutschland, 
Mannheim, Case 2 O 103/14, judgement on 10 March 2015; Sisvel v. Haier, Cases 4a O 93/14 and 4a O 
144/14, judgement on 3 November 2015; Sisvel v. Haier, Cases I-15 U 65/15 and I-15 U 66/15, judgement 
on 13 January 2016; Saint Lawrence Communications v. Vodafone, Case 4a O 73/14, judgement on 31 
March 2016; Unwired Planet v. Huawei EWHC 958 (Pat), judgement on 29 April 2016 & EWHC 711 
(Pat), judgement on 05 April 2017; Conversant v Huawei & ZTE, EWHC 1687 (Pat), judgement on 4 July 
2019. 
222
 Cases 4a O 93/14 and 4a O 144/1. 
223
Morrison Forester; FRAND case law in Europe after Huawei z. ZTE, found at www.mofo.com, 5 April 
2019.  
224
 Cases 4a O 93/14 and 4a O 144/1, paragraph 91.  
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In Saint Lawrence v. Telekom225 the SEP holder, Saint Lawrence, brought an action 
against Telekom and HTC seeking, once again, an injunctive relief.226 The accused 
infringement of products included HTC’s supplied mobile phones which made HTC part 
of the court proceedings as they supported Telekom.227 Telekom had rejected a license 
offer given by Saint Lawrence, whilst HTC did give a counteroffer limited to the area of 
Germany. Telekom referred to a FRAND defense and to HTC’s offer, which the court 
rejected. The Mannheim Court held that the offer was not specific enough – it did not 
include specific royalty amounts. Further, two questions were left unanswered from the 
case: 1) Saint Lawrence did not notice the infringers of the infringement prior to filing an 
action; and 2) the counteroffer was made by HTC and not by the defendant itself.228  The 
Mannheim Court was clearly not as strict as the Düsseldorf Regional Court in Sisvel v. 
Haier. However, it is imperative to note that in both of the cases the court rules in favor 
of the SEP holder and neither court reviewed whether the requirements set by the Huawei 
ruling were met.  
 
Saint Lawrence has been dragged into another SEP dispute against Vodafone concerning 
an infringement against the exact same patent.229 However, this time the Düsseldorf 
Regional Court carried out an actual analysis regarding the Huawei requirement230 of 
expressing one’s willingness to enter into a license agreement. The Regional Court held 
that in order for a FRAND defense to become compelling, operators must manage to 
entrust on a FRAND defense of the manufacturer or supplier.231 Yet, the defendant, 
Vodafone, did not meet the requirements regarding submitting its willingness to conclude 
 
225
 Case 2 O 103/14. 
226 Against Saint Lawrence’s European Patent EP 1 125 276.  
227
Mannheim Regional Court rejects FRAND defense in its first ruling on the issue following the ECJ 
ruling Huawei vs. ZTE found at http://eplaw.org.   
228
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a license. Furthermore, the court analyzed additionally, the SEP holder’s obligation to 
submit a written FRAND offer concerning royalties. The Court assessed that a 
corresponding offer does not violate FRAND232, which means that a royalty rate ought 
to correspond with similar available standard royalty rates. Further, the European 
Commission’s publication commented the case concerning royalties:  
 
“As FRAND is usually not an exact amount but rather a range, the claimant 
is not required to disclose a mathematical derivation. It is, therefore, in 
principle sufficient to disclose the basic considerations that led to the amount 
of the claimed royalty. Saint Lawrence Communication was held to have 
fulfilled this obligation by referring to a standard licensing royalty and its 
acceptance in the market.”233  
 
In 2017, The High Court of London (patent court) gave a ruling at the original request of 
Unwired Planet, who brought an action against Huawei back in 2014.234 Unwired Planet 
had a large patent portfolio which included SEPs regarding, inter alia,  2G, 3G and LTE. 
Unwired Planet sued the defendants Huawei, Samsung and Google for an infringement 
of five SEPs of the mentioned standards.235 The High Court had to decide on granting an 
injunction by examining, if Unwired Planet had in fact i) abused article 102 TFEU, and 
therefore its dominant position; and ii) the requirements set in the Huawei case. Numerous 
of different trials begun i.e. technical trials determining the validity and infringement and 
non-technical trials addressing both FRAND and competition law issues.236 Later on, 
both Samsung and Google settled the claims with Unwired Planet leading to Huawei 
becoming the sole defendant.237 The Court held, that two patents were valid and further, 
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that they had indeed been infringed.238 And finally, the Court held that Huawei ought to 
take a global license from Unwired Planet  
 
The High Court provided clearly how the present case can, versus cannot, be deviated 
from the Huawei ruling, comprising of a list of eight elements. The list includes 
discussion of the procedural framework regarding negotiation as provided in Huawei, 
criticism against ECJ’s lack of decision concerning the identification of what constitutes 
‘abuse’239 along with the courts own reasoning of what constitutes de facto an ‘abuse’, 
and note, for the first time, how to calculate a FRAND royalty rate.240 The court held that 
a FRAND royalty rate may be assessed by taking into account following factors: i) the 
royalty rate should be compared with a wide range of different licenses; ii) same license 
equals same royalty rate; iii) circumstances and time may affect the license rate; iv) the 
license rate cannot be in conjunction with a wider arrangement; v) the license must 
eliminate both hold-up and hold-out theories; vi) if a licensee seeks the exact same license 
as another licensee, the royalty rate may only be the exact same if the difference does not 
distort competition; vii) size and value of a patent portfolio may affect the rate; and finally 
viii) a license rate is always uncertain and therefore, it cannot be overly precise.241  
 
Huawei appealed the ruling on three grounds: i) the court does not have jurisdiction to 
issue a global license; ii) a licensee may not demand a lower royalty rate than the 
benchmark the court already assessed; and iii) Unwired Planet abused its dominant 
position by not compelling with the procedural framework. However, it is worth 
mentioning that the appeal did not concern the royalty assessment as the High Court had 
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determined. The Court of Appeal dismissed all of the three grounds of appeal and held 
that Unwired Planet had not abused its dominant position.242  
 
On 21st of October 2019, Huawei made an opening submission against Unwired Planet 
to five UK Supreme Court Justices claiming inconsistency within the English Courts, due 
to the previous ruling with Unwired Planet.243 Huawei’s appeal to the Supreme Court 
includes the following issues: i) English Court’s lack of power to set royalty rates for 
foreign patents and grant injunction of UK SEPs without a global license and without 
parties’ agreement; ii) if English Courts does have the power as stated in i), is England 
the right place for proceedings taken into account Conversant proceedings244; iii) the true 
meaning of non-discriminatory within FRAND undertaking i.e. must the same license be 
offered to Huawei as already offered to Samsung; and iv) Does ECJ’s Huawei ruling 
actually indicate that a SEP holder can seek an injunction restraining infringement of 
SEPs.245 It will be fascinating to see the outcome of the ruling considering the first ever 
attempt to asses on FRAND royalty rates, however, it remains to be seen whether the 
court possesses enough power for setting such royalty rates in practice.  
 
Within Conversant v. Huawei & ZTE246, which is on-going at the Supreme Court analogy 
with Unwired Planet v. Huawei,  the Court of Appeal held that a global FRAND license 
was effective on the same reasons as in Unwired Planet v. Huawei, however, the plaintiff 
could not impose the license but rather injunct the defendants if they did not accept the 
license terms. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court by the defendants by referring 
to the court’s jurisdiction of determining a global FRAND license i.e. the royalty 
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assessment from Unwired Planet v. Huawei,  and not only a UK one.247 The court hearing 
was held at the Supreme Court on 24 October 2019. The Supreme Court face the exact 
same questions as in Unwired Planet v. Huawei248 – the two cases will most likely be 
judged analogy due to the similarities between the cases.  
 
Both of the UK cases are very intriguing, due to the fact that they actually did assess on 
how to decide on a FRAND royalty rate, and further, that the assessment of the royalty 
rate was never appealed to neither the Appeal Court nor the to the Supreme Court, still 
awaiting to be judged. Even though the cases still await their faiths, it is a benchmark for 
our precedent, taken into account that these are the sole rulings that have even the slightest 
examined the issue and meaning of FRAND from a royalty rate perspective, and 
extensively discussed them. Yet, one should not take the royalty assessment too severe – 
even though we have received guidelines on how to assess a FRAND royalty rate, we 
have not yet assessed on the term ‘FRAND’ itself, which makes the whole assessment 
rather senseless. However, as the courts focused on determining a FRAND royalty rate, 
they lacked an analysis of the enforcement of injunctive relief – one can consider which 
question is more imperative to examine? 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
 
Ultimately, there are two major cases on going in the United Kingdom, regarding the 
definition of FRAND. It will be exciting to see the outcomes of the courts; the judgement 
will not only be from the Supreme Court, but additionally, the disputes include both 
Huawei and ZTE as parties, who was part of the ‘original ruling’, which led to the debate 
these cases faces now. These rulings might set new requirements to SEP licensing under 
FRAND terms, provided that the Supreme Court supports the High Court’s assessment 
regarding FRAND royalties. The Supreme Court’s ruling might even overrule the Huawei 
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ruling – the courts might actually finally define FRAND from different perspectives and 
establish rules on what constitute an abuse of Article 102 TFEU as reliable precedent.  
 
As stated above, there has been quite a few follow-up cases after the Huawei ruling. All 
the mentioned cases have basically faced the same issues: i) can an injunction take effect 
if the licensee is willing to take / offers a license; ii) does all the requirements of the 
Huawei ruling have to be met, and if one is not met, can the case be dismissed; and iii) in 
what case does a royalty rate abuse FRAND. Most of the cases have been appealed, and 
even some have reached the Supreme Court – which strengthens the conception of 
FRAND’s complicated and complex framework. Yet, questions remain unanswered, and 
one may ask, why these uncertainties have not received a concise answer, rather, varying 
answers from different jurisdictions; when does a license offer actually comply with the 
regulations of FRAND or in which situations has the licensor abused its dominant market 
position? The following chapter shall analyze and discuss the findings this chapter has 
provided, and further examine policy recommendation possibilities for both the questions 
case law faces and the general issues the EU faces.   
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4. Analysis and discussion 
4.1. Introduction 
 
By licensing under FRAND terms, it is possible to avoid and to prevent risks, including 
but not limited to, patent hold-up or excessive royalties and further, to ensure 
interoperability and accessibility to a standard. Yet, there are issues arising out of such 
licensing such as anti-trust issues due to FRAND-encumbrances.249 In addition to 
competition law concerns, the vagueness of the scope of the term ‘FRAND’ has been the 
cause of several disputes along the way between licensing parties. The solutions to these 
questions remain unanswered; each party participating in SEP and FRAND, both 
licensing and standardization process, are part of the solution – each party has its own 
role.  
 
As of today, we can only expect more disputes arising out of SEPs due to 5G and Internet 
of Things (IoT), and there does not seem to be any rapid solution by the EU in reaching 
a unitary solution for the current issues, not to speak of the upcoming issues thereunder. 
Nonetheless, licensing parties are aware of what needs to be done in order to avoid 
injunctions, but the simple meaning of FRAND is still unanswered, which is, mostly, the 
cause of disputes presently. And the disputes are only growing, since not only mobile 
phone technologies, but also e.g. smart home technologies are increasing, which further 
means that new stakeholders and manufacturers are stumbling on SEP disputes i.e. 
litigation.250  
 
As Rudi Bekker from Eidenhoven University of Technology points out; if there are 
regulations on an EU level, then it applies to every single technology, but solely in 
Europe. However, if SSOs are setting the regulations, then it applies only to the one 
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technology i.e. the standard, but it is applicable in the whole world.251 Which solution is 
more suitable? Additionally, as WIPO and the UK rulings points out, SEP license rates 
and license terms, including royalty rates,  differ from country to country, and even from 
region to region, which means that basically all possible licensees are unique and may 
differentiate from other licensees, but still comply with FRAND terms.252 Therefore, 
FRAND cannot be definite, it may vary and should be assessed in casu.  
 
4.2. Results of analyzing case law 
 
There are several positive, but also negative, justifications from the above interpreted 
cases. The mentioned cases were based on both German and United Kingdom’s prime 
SEP cases regarding FRAND disputes.253 The biggest different between the two 
countries’ rulings are the interpretation of the procedural framework provided from 
Huawei v. ZTE254. 
 
The Huawei ruling, as already discussed, provided incentives but also confusion. The 
underlying confusion of the case lie within the phrase ‘up to national courts to decide’255, 
but at the same time the court wishes to leave substantial decision-making room for the 
licensing negotiations parties, to assess by themselves what FRAND is. The fact that there 
was not, prior to the Huawei ruling, any precedent regarding the constitution of abuse of 
dominant position in SEP licensing negotiations, makes it even more peculiar, that the 
ECJ did not determine it. Instead, they created the procedural framework and i) let 
national courts decide on the abuse of dominant position and ii) provide opportunities for 
the parties to agree prior to court’s interference.  
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The case can be observed from two angels, the first would state that the case is quite 
meaningless and the other, that it is an essential ruling. The latter is the typical view on 
the matter due to the created procedural framework, which helps both the licensor and 
licensee, to avoid/reach injunctions. The former view, and the lesser popular one, has 
grounds due to the lack of definition and interpretation room left by the ruling, in other 
words, even though the ruling created something useful for SEP holders and potential 
licensees, the ruling increased the uncertainty that already existed in scope of SEP 
licensing – especially taken into account IoT and the rise of SEPs thereof. The question 
however is, which angle of the ruling weights more? Yet, the most integral part of the 
ruling is the national court’s interpretation of it, and their effects on both precedent, future 
rulings, regulations and licensing negotiation parties.  
 
The Huawei ruling has had a big effect on German courts, since the original request of a 
preliminary ruling to the ECJ came from a German court, which makes it rather bizarre 
that German courts favored the SEP holders and refused to review whether the 
requirements set by the Huawei ruling were in fact met.256 What was the whole purpose 
of the Huawei ruling, if courts are not following the created framework – did the German 
courts have such a strong covenant towards their already used guidelines that they simply 
neglected the ruling? 
 
Despite the neglect against the Huawei ruling’s procedural framework, the German courts 
took into account and investigated the determination of a FRAND offer i.e. submitting an 
offer that is specific enough. According to the courts, not only a licensor’s offer, but also 
the counteroffer of a licensee has to be specific enough, especially in regard to royalty 
rates – the party submitting the offer, has to express its willingness to enter into a license 
agreement, henceforth, it is of high importance that the parties’ offers are definite in order 
to follow the procedural framework/receive a FRAND defense and to avoid/enforce 
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injunctions. Yet, the courts failed to assess on the continuing matter on determining 
excessive royalties. 
 
The United Kingdoms’ cases257, as has already been acknowledge, are yet to be decided 
by the Supreme Court. However, the lower courts examined the procedural framework 
provided and gave their rulings according to it – both pending cases examined the 
determination of a global FRAND license, including how to assess a FRAND royalty 
rate. However, as it seems, in neither of the cases were the defendants i.e. the licensees, 
satisfied with the rulings. The jurisdiction of the courts has been disputed by the licensees 
– can one jurisdiction really ‘force’ parties into a global license with a threat of restraining 
an infringement? Furthermore, does the jurisdiction additionally have the right to set a 
global FRAND royalty rate for that license, even though, as it seems, royalty rates may 
vary from region to region, depending on several factors. Evidently the licensor, in other 
words, the SEP holder, would not argue with a court’s decision to set a global FRAND 
license, but at the same time, they eschew the chance to restrain the ongoing infringement. 
Further, would a licensor be content with the fact that a court may decide whether the 
license is FRAND compliant, as well as determine the royalty rate of the global license? 
 
The German and UK rulings are quite dissimilar; however, they both favored the SEP 
holder rather than the willing/unwilling licensee. Neither of the jurisdiction found that the 
licensee had done enough to avoid injunctive relief and further, neither of the jurisdiction 
examined whether the SEP holder had abused its dominant position. Yet, both of the 
jurisdictions’ rulings have faced more difficulties, than practical benefits of the Huawei 
ruling, due to the inadequacy and absence of a persistent set of rules, in addition to the 
procedural framework. From one point of a view, it seems as the courts made it more 
difficult than it already was, by not complying with the given guidelines, but on the other 
hand, the courts found new viewpoints towards FRAND-encumbrances and the meaning 
of such, at least within the UK courts. Furthermore, the UK courts were clearly stricter 
than the German courts – as already mentioned, the German courts did not seem to care 
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at all about following previous precedent,  meaning the Huawei ruling, only about their 
own point of views and frames.  
 
As stated, the biggest differences between the two jurisdictions’ rulings is the endeavor 
the UK courts concluded, whilst the German courts basically ignored the whole 
procedural framework. If there is a willing licensee, then all the facts ought to be 
examined i.e. has the SEP holder informed the infringer of the infringement, where after 
the licensee has agreed to enter into a license agreement and diligently answered to the 
offer thereof.  Accordingly, within the UK, the cases have reached the Supreme Court, 
whilst in Germany, the rulings never reached higher courts, which is rather contradict – 
as acknowledged, German courts did not examine the cases profoundly nor did they 
follow the procedural framework, but the parties were still, to some extent, content with 
the rulings, since only one of the cases were disputed by the licensee. Nevertheless, the 
rulings from the UK Supreme Court will be awaited – it will be a groundbreaking 
benchmark for future FRAND disputes.  
 
There are several observations and questions arising out of the case analysis: i) standard 
of review258; ii) selective enforcement; iii) global license;  iv) royalty stacking/portfolio 
splitting259; and v) calculation of FRAND royalties. Whilst the first and second 
observation are primitive and essential, the third and fourth are distorted questions, and 
the last is an on-going mystery, although it was assessed by the High Court. Standard of 
review by higher courts have shown to be a favorable act – especially when lower courts 
have not been diligent enough. Additionally, the selective enforcement, as it seems, has 
occupied both the courts and the parties; the parties are accredited to construct a favorable 
outcome i.e. by following the procedural framework or, in less fortunate cases, ending up 
with an injunctive relief. The courts seem to also have an effect on the enforcement i.e. 
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the UK cases, wherein the courts ‘forces’ the parties to enter into a global license with 
the threat of restraining the injunction, which includes our third question regarding 
obtaining a global license.  
 
Royalty stacking/portfolio splitting and the calculation of FRAND royalties are questions 
that might never be fully understood. The former has to be analyzed with regard to Article 
102 TFEU and abuse of dominant position, whilst the latter, is in conjunction with the 
former but also as an independent element. It is not sufficient to determine FRAND 
royalty rates if the scope of the expression is not coherent, which is why SEP licensing 
is, as of today, disjointed due to mandatory FRAND-encumbrances. Furthermore, even 
though the UK court assessed on how to determine a FRAND royalty rate, the royalty 
cannot be taken for granted since the term FRAND itself has never been fully determined. 
Moreover, the royalty assessment should not be taken too sincerely, rather as a ‘safe-
harbor’ provision.  
 
4.3. Identification of the issues and their effects 
 
Issues relating to SEP licensing has been presented throughout the thesis – as seen, it is 
not always evident nor straightforward to determine the issues per se. As it concludes, the 
following issues have been identified:  
 
1) The struggle of defining the scope of the term ‘FRAND’; 
2) What laws and principles govern SEP licensing; 
3) How specific does a license offer have to be in order to agile with the 
procedural framework; 
4) In what cases can an injunction be enforced;  
5) What is seen as an excessive royalty rate; 
6) SEP holders breach or neglect of FRAND commitments. 
7) Patent hold-out 
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As listed above, there are a handful of identified issues regarding SEP licensing, all of 
which concern different elements thereunder. One of the most difficult issues to solve is 
the definition of the scope of the term FRAND – as seen, there has never been a persistent 
explanation of the term in practice. FRAND is interpreted differently i.e. ‘Fair’ is not 
even always included in the definition, and the ‘Non-Discriminatory’ it still vague. A SEP 
holder’s abuse of dominant position is linked with the ‘Non-Discriminatory’ component. 
As seen through case law and monographs, the abuse of a dominant position has never 
been distinctly defined, the expression is more or less determined in casu, without a 
persistent set of rules to follow. As know, competition law principles, including Article 
102 TFEU, is regulating FRAND due to its restrictions of how a SEP holder may act. 
Furthermore, contract law principles have been used on regulating SEP licensing, 
however, it has never been determined whether contract law principles are legitimate to 
be applied thereunder. Accordingly, we await a solution that will combine our existing 
legislation in pursuance of creating a so called ‘unitary patent system’, without loopholes 
and national interpretations/judgements.  
 
In continuance of the compiled issues list, the question regarding how specific a FRAND 
offer has to be has caused quite a few disputes, not only from the licensor’s point of view, 
but as it seems, also for the licensee’s counteroffer. A license offer has to specifically 
apprise all of the aspects constituted by a license agreement, included but not limited to, 
royalty rates. Additionally, the offers have to be submitted diligently after receiving them. 
Accordingly, the offer has to be submitted with a hasty schedule and be definite, which 
provides a clear understanding to the fact that offers may be incomplete. The fourth issue, 
what is seen as an excessive royalty rate, goes hand in hand with specifying a license 
offer. Even though there are some guidelines on the matter it remains vague due to the 
fact that royalty rates may vary from region to region and the term FRAND is yet not 
determined exclusively.  
 
Both perspectives of seeking injunctions have been discussed; it has been enforced and 
denied. But the question remain, in which cases can an injunction be enforced – does all 
of the procedural framework steps have to be fulfilled or can one seek an injunction even 
if all of the steps are not met? Furthermore, can a SEP holder enforce the injunction if all 
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of the steps are met, even though the infringer expresses willingness to take a license? 
Once more, enforcing an injunction does not seem to have an ending, prior to receiving 
precedent that cannot be avoided nor interpreted.  Furthermore, the UK Supreme Court’s 
rulings are awaited and hopefully they will bring clarity to the current situation. 
 
The aforementioned, an abuse of dominant position, is part of the identified issue a SEP 
holder’s breach or neglect of FRAND commitments. A SEP holder may not i) 
discriminate a willing licensee, ii) enforce an injunction before notifying the licensee of 
the infringement and iii) impose unfair license terms within the license agreement, that 
further have to be submitted promptly in written. As stated, several times throughout the 
thesis, we still lack a persistent definition of what constitutes an abuse; is it the fact that 
a SEP holder directly discriminates a licensee, or does it additionally include indirect 
discrimination such as demanding, unknowingly, unfair royalty rates. Furthermore, the 
fact that a SEP holder would not inform the infringer of the infringement, prior to seeking 
an injunction, indicates on the dominant position, and perhaps that is indeed the position 
the licensor wishes to show off. An infringer has to be given the chance to enter into a 
license agreement before an injunction takes force – can the SEP holder enforce the 
injunction if the infringer is undoubtably unaware of the infringement, and would very 
much like to enter into a license agreement? 
 
One aspect that may have gone unnoticed for many, is the patent hold-out theory, caused 
by the licensee or implementer of the patent, whilst the patent hold-up theory concerned 
SEP holders extracting excessive royalty rates.260 Licensees may seem to be in good faith 
from one point of view, but from another, they might actually undertake the patent hold-
out theory – the licensee, or implementer, ignores the SEP holders license offer in order 
to aggravate the other party to agree to terms which are way below the actual FRAND 
commitment. This argument starts the debate; could competition law principles be 
implemented on a licensee’s behavior as well?   
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4.4. Policy recommendations for licensing under FRAND terms  
 
The previous parts of the chapter have identified the issues that have been debated about 
from beginning to end. As the issues are so vast and lacking solutions, this part of the 
thesis will provide policy recommendations thereof. The recommendations will not solve 
an issue per se – the essence of the recommendations is to provide an alternative way for 
licensing negotiation parties and authorities to avoid the specified issues. The policy 
recommendations provided hereunder are based on existing precedent, monographs, 
doctrines and most importantly,  on the discussion provided formerly in this thesis.  
 
First of all, for the avoidance of doubt, each party of licensing negotiations are part of the 
process of avoiding disputes by abiding FRAND commitments i.e. authorities can aid to 
diminish licensing issues by reviewing actor’s complying with competition law 
regulations and further, SSOs should try to institute cogent governances so that members 
are aware of what principles ought to be followed and determine a persistent set of rules 
determining what is a FRAND-royalty rate, by applying the UK ruling’s assessment. 
Accordingly, each and every one is depending on one another to create a functioning 
market. Therefore, the first recommendation, or merely an advice than a rigorous policy 
recommendation, is for participants to collaborate more well-organized and in sync, in 
order to dodge disputes and ambiguousness, pursuing some kind of unitary patent system. 
The patent system within the EU have to become more transparent in order to answer, 
including but not limited to,  what makes an essential patent essential to a standard or 
how to set explicit terms for FRAND licensing.   
 
We need to achieve more stability within SEP licensing – the dynamics between licensor 
and licensee have to be based on rules which are not ambiguous. An entire policy cannot 
be based on i) one viewpoint or ii) millions of different viewpoints. Therefore, we need 
incentives and motivational factors for each party of the process for them to agree to 
follow common rules and customary laws, take as an example lex mercatoroia – parties 
should be able to have faith in each other. Furthermore, as IoT is increasingly growing 
and becoming part of the SEP market, time is of the essence to achieve such customary 
 72 
 
 
laws each service area and market ought to follow, including but not limited to, the 
telecommunication market. 
 
In addition to transparency and cooperation between actors and authorities, the European 
policies concerning SEP and FRAND licensing, ought to be changed by taking into 
account both patent hold-up and patent hold-out theories. Although, the analyzed case 
law has clearly taken into account to some extent the obligations a licensee faces, however 
the theory per se should be promoted and develop the evolution of our future unitary 
patent system. Accordingly, the term ‘hold-out’ should be used in practice, rather than 
only in a hypothetical manner. Which is why, the European Commission should take into 
account this reflection as they currently revise the antitrust guidance on standardization 
agreements from 2011.261 Further, the Commission should acknowledge the rulings 
regarding SEP licensing, as well as ongoing disputes in the ‘real world’ and not only 
amend the guidelines on an literature level or leave it for national courts to decide, since 
that would simply lead to more contradictions. It is imperative to understand the 
relationship between a licensor and a licensee and understand their competitiveness 
against each other – both parties can, and potentially may, act in mala fide.  
 
Bilateral licensing agreements have imprinted at least the mobile communication market 
which, as seen, has caused several disputes between the parties. A solution to bilateral 
disputes would be to engage in multilateral licensing agreements i.e. patent pools –
especially for smaller patent holders that do not have as much competitors and within IoT 
which is still an emerging business. Moreover, perhaps patent pools should additionally 
be encouraged within the scope of EU competition law. Yet, bilateral negotiations might 
continue to be the prime solution for companies that dominate the mobile communication 
market i.e. Nokia, Samsung or Apple due to the fact that the amount of money that are at 
stake is exponentially more compared to other markets’ standards.262 Further, the patent 
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pool solution might not be a one-fits-all-solution, but rather provide an alternative 
solution to bilateral negotiations that might work for certain markets.  
 
As it seems, there is not a clear solution for the issues mentioned in the thesis, moreover, 
the policy recommendations should be seen as advices for actors to avoid greater 
controversies. Yet, the core solution for the issues lies within the parties themselves – 
governments and courts try to balance the meaning of FRAND aiming at business owners 
reaching an agreeable outcome by themselves – yet, FRAND licensing may not always 
be the best outcome for negotiating parties. Parties of licensing negotiations are capable 
of mutually agree on their own FRAND terms and further, reduce transactions costs due 
to their own views and unique circumstances. Furthermore, parties should pursue in 
reaching their own flexible and unique license agreements based on their own viewpoints 
due to the fact that FRAND varies from origin to origin and from market to market, and 
a FRAND commitment has to be established in casu – as Johnson points out in WIPO 
Magazine: “FRAND for one is not FRAND for all – at least not anymore”263. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
 
As the thesis has worked its way through all of the elements comprising SEP licensing 
and examined the issues thereto, in particular in conjunction with the term FRAND,  it is 
fair to acknowledge on the grounds of the thesis, that the issues of SEP licensing cannot 
be solved easily. As the research question of the thesis is to identify and evaluate the 
problems arising out of SEP licensing under FRAND terms, including case law 
observations around Europe, the policy recommendations provided should not be seen in 
a strict sense, merely as a bunch of advices on how to avoid greater issues, but 
conceivably not solving the current ones. However, for the avoidance of doubt, FRAND 
issues are so complex that it is impossible to determine ‘one’ solution, instead, one ought 
to acknowledge the issues in order to not complement them farther. Accordingly, one 
should not forget about competition law principles and their part in SEP licensing, 
regardless if the standard in question is a de jure or a de facto standard. Furthermore, the 
Huawei ruling should be seen by negotiating parties as a ‘safe-harbor’ provision, 
providing them assistance in avoiding the enforcement of injunctions and abuse of 
dominant position. Moreover, the comprised list of such core issues from both case law 
and monographs, including their effects, should be furthered examined – it is up to future 
scholars to examine these issues further, including worldwide case law for the sake of 
expanding the research area and material in order for these actors to develop feasible de 
lege ferenda solutions.  
 
As we are going into the future, inventing new essential technologies and creating new 
standards, we should stop and think about what the situation, including its issues, looks 
like now, instead of only looking forward as we are habited to do. If we do not solve the 
issues of today, the issues of tomorrow will only increase and become more difficult to 
solve on both a national and international level. The true meaning of FRAND has always 
been to benefit both parties, regardless of size and power, and neither the licensor nor the 
licensee has ever chosen nor aimed at creating disputes voluntarily. As the 5G network 
and IoT is rapidly growing, they will undoubtedly bring new problems, adding on to the 
already existing ones, which is why the resolution of SEP licensing ought to take into 
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account all aspects, including all actors in different markets, when figuring out our future 
technological IP regime. As Fransisco Migorance stated:  
 
“Today is a good day for consumers around the world, as well as the many 
businesses – small and large – that will rely on ‘fair reasonable and non-
discriminatory’ access to the 5G open technology standard to create new 
products and services for the upcoming Internet of Things.” “IP Europe’s 
members welcome any initiative that will lead to smoother licensing 
negotiations. We note that this is particularly important for our SME 
members because they need as much support in the licensing process as the 
SME implementers."264 
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